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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 In Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 
2017), we declined to imply a Bivens cause of action against 
airport screeners employed by the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) in part because they “typically are not 
law enforcement officers and do not act as such.”  Id. at 208.  
We now must decide a related question that we anticipated, but 
did not resolve, in Vanderklok: whether TSA screeners are 
“investigative or law enforcement officers” under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 
 This question, one of first impression among the Courts 
of Appeals, arises because Appellant Nadine Pellegrino has 
asserted intentional tort claims against TSA screeners.  
Although under the FTCA the United States generally enjoys 
sovereign immunity for intentional torts committed by federal 
employees, this rule is subject to an exception known as the 
“law enforcement proviso,” which waives immunity for a 
subset of intentional torts committed by employees who 
qualify as “investigative or law enforcement officers.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2680(h).  Pellegrino’s claims may proceed only if 
TSA screeners fall into this category. 
 Based on our review of the statute’s text, purpose, and 
legislative history, as well as precedent from this Court and 
other Courts of Appeals, we now reach the conclusion that we 
foreshadowed in Vanderklok and hold that TSA screeners are 
not “investigative or law enforcement officers” under the law 
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enforcement proviso.  Pellegrino’s claims are therefore barred 
by the Government’s sovereign immunity, and we will affirm 
the District Court’s judgment dismissing this action. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 A. Airport Security and Screeners 
 To place what follows in proper context, we briefly 
describe the structure of the TSA and the screeners’ place 
within that structure.  Congress created the TSA in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with 
the enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).  The head 
of the TSA is the Under Secretary of Transportation for 
Security, 49 U.S.C. § 114(b), who is responsible for security in 
all modes of transportation, including civil aviation, id. 
§ 114(d). 
 Pertinent here is the Under Secretary’s responsibility to 
“provide for the screening of all passengers and property, 
including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked 
baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a 
passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air 
carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation.”  Id. 
§ 44901(a).  With exceptions not relevant here, this screening 
is required to be performed “by a Federal Government 
employee.”  Id.  These employees were referred to as 
“screeners” at the time of the ATSA’s enactment but were 
reclassified as “Transportation Security Officers” (TSOs) in 
2005 as part of an effort to improve morale and combat 
employee-retention problems.  The Transportation Security 
Administration’s Airline Passenger and Baggage Screening: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 
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109th Cong. 7 (2006) [hereinafter Screening Hearing] 
(statement of Edmund “Kip” Hawley, Assistant Secretary, 
Transportation Security Administration).1  In 2016, the TSA 
screened more than 2 million passengers per day.  See Bob 
Burns, TSA Year in Review, Transp. Sec. Admin. (Jan. 12, 
2017), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/01/12/tsa-year-review-
record-amount-firearms-discovered-2016. 
 TSOs form just one part of the airport-security 
apparatus.  The Under Secretary may also designate employees 
to serve as “law enforcement officer[s].”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 114(p)(1).  An employee so designated may carry a firearm, 
make arrests, and seek and execute warrants for arrest or 
seizure of evidence.  Id. § 114(p)(2).  The Under Secretary is 
required to deploy law enforcement personnel at each 
screening location; typically, at least one such law enforcement 
officer must be at each location.  Id. § 44901(h)(1)–(2).  
Screening locations are thus staffed by both TSOs and law 
enforcement officers. 
 B. Factual Background2 
 In 2006, Pellegrino and her husband, Harry Waldman, 
arrived at the Philadelphia International Airport, where they 
planned to catch a flight home to Florida.  Pellegrino brought 
                                              
1 Throughout this opinion, we will use the terms “TSO” 
and “TSA screener” without distinction. 
2 Because the District Court granted summary judgment 
in the defendants’ favor, we view the facts in the light most 
favorable to Pellegrino.  See, e.g., Moody v. Atl. City Bd. of 
Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 210 n.1 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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three bags to the security checkpoint: a rolling tote, a larger 
rolling bag that would fit in the overhead compartment of the 
airplane, and a small black canvas bag.  After Pellegrino passed 
through a metal detector, a TSO directed her to step aside for 
further screening.  A few minutes later, TSO Thomas 
Clemmons arrived and began to search Pellegrino’s bags, but 
because Pellegrino believed that Clemmons was treating 
neither her nor her bags respectfully, she asked for a private 
screening.  According to Pellegrino, Clemmons then “walked 
off with a very arrogant, negative, hostile attitude,” Pellegrino 
Dep. 85:24–86:2, D.Ct. Dkt. No. 156, and TSO Nuyriah 
Abdul-Malik came to perform the screening in Clemmons’s 
stead.   
As Abdul-Malik prepared to search Pellegrino’s bags, 
Pellegrino “had the distinct feeling” that Abdul-Malik’s gloves 
were not clean and asked her to put on new ones.  Pellegrino 
Dep. 90:18–22, D.Ct. Dkt. No. 156.  Abdul-Malik did as 
Pellegrino asked, but Pellegrino asserts that this request 
engendered hostility from Abdul-Malik.  Abdul-Malik and 
Pellegrino then proceeded to a private screening room, where 
they were joined by TSA employees Laura Labbee, a 
supervisory TSO, and Denise Kissinger, another TSO.3  
Kissinger swabbed Pellegrino’s shirt and left the room to test 
the sample (for the presence of explosives), while Abdul-Malik 
inspected Pellegrino’s luggage.  Pellegrino contends that 
Abdul-Malik’s screening was unnecessarily rough and 
                                              
3 Labbee was a supervisor, but because no party has 
claimed that her duties were materially different from those of 
Abdul-Malik or Kissinger, we will not distinguish among their 
positions.  
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invasive—extending to her credit cards, coins, cell phone, and 
lipstick.   
 At some point, Pellegrino asked Labbee why she was 
being subjected to this screening, and Labbee responded that it 
was an “airline-designated search.”  Pellegrino Dep. 104:12, 
D.Ct. Dkt. No. 156.  Pellegrino took this to mean that her 
airline ticket had been marked in a way that prompted the 
search, and because she and Waldman had accidentally 
switched tickets, she sought to stop the search by explaining 
that she believed that Waldman should have been searched 
instead.  Nevertheless, the search continued, and Pellegrino 
told Labbee that she was going to report her to TSA authorities. 
 Once Abdul-Malik finished searching the rolling tote, 
Pellegrino, who believed that Abdul-Malik had damaged her 
eyeglasses and jewelry, asked Abdul-Malik to leave her items 
outside the tote so that Pellegrino could re-pack it herself.  
Abdul-Malik refused and the interaction continued to 
deteriorate.  First, Abdul-Malik had trouble zipping the tote 
closed and had to press her knee into it to force it shut.  Next, 
when Pellegrino asked Labbee for permission to examine the 
tote, which she believed Abdul-Malik had damaged, that 
request was also denied.  Pellegrino then told Labbee and 
Abdul-Malik they were “behaving like bitches.”  Pellegrino 
Dep. 114:13–14, D.Ct. Dkt. No. 156.  Finally, after Abdul-
Malik had searched Pellegrino’s largest bag, which contained 
clothes and shoes, and Kissinger finished swabbing and 
testing, Pellegrino was told that she could leave. 
But simple closure was not to be.  Instead, Pellegrino 
saw that Abdul-Malik had not re-packed her shoes, asked if she 
intended to do so, and was told “no.”  Pellegrino Dep. 122:2, 
D.Ct. Dkt. No. 156.  At that point, intending to re-pack her bags 
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outside of the screening room, Pellegrino tossed her shoes 
through the open door toward the screening lanes and began to 
carry her largest bag out of the room.  In the process, according 
to Labbee and Kissinger, she struck Labbee in the stomach 
with the bottom of the bag.  When Pellegrino then returned to 
the screening room for her smaller rolling tote, Abdul-Malik 
allegedly stood in her way, forcing her to crawl on the floor 
under a table to retrieve it.  According to the TSOs, Pellegrino 
then struck Abdul-Malik in the leg with this bag as she was 
removing it.  Although Pellegrino denied (and has consistently 
denied) that either bag touched either TSO, Labbee and Abdul-
Malik immediately went to the supervisor’s station to press 
charges against Pellegrino. 
Philadelphia police officers arrived at the scene a short 
time later, arrested Pellegrino, and took her to the police 
station, where she was held for about 18 hours before being 
released on bond.  Eventually, the Philadelphia District 
Attorney’s Office filed ten charges against Pellegrino: two 
counts each of felony aggravated assault, see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2702; possession of instruments of a crime, see id. § 907; 
reckless endangerment, see id. § 2705; simple assault, see id. 
§ 2701; and making terroristic threats, see id. § 2706. 
 By the time the matter proceeded to trial in Philadelphia 
Municipal Court, however, Abdul-Malik was no longer 
employed by the TSA and did not appear.  And because the 
trial judge had ruled that no witnesses could testify about 
events that took place outside of the private screening room in 
the absence of footage from video surveillance, Labbee—who 
was positioned partially outside the door of the screening room 
during the alleged assault—was precluded from testifying to 
those events.  Without that testimony, the trial judge entered a 
verdict of not guilty. 
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 In July 2008, Pellegrino submitted a claim to the TSA 
concerning the TSOs’ alleged misconduct and requesting 
damages of $951,200.  The TSA denied the claim by letter 
almost a year later. 
 C. Procedural Background 
 In November 2009, Pellegrino and Waldman4 
commenced this civil rights action in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, naming as defendants the United States, the 
TSA, Abdul-Malik, Labbee, and Kissinger, and raising FTCA 
claims as to all defendants for (a) property damage, (b) false 
arrest/false imprisonment, (c) malicious prosecution, (d) civil 
conspiracy, (e) defamation, and (f) intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.  In addition, as to the individual 
defendants, they raised Bivens claims for malicious and 
retaliatory prosecution, “aiding and abetting” malicious 
prosecution, and conspiracy to deprive civil rights, as well as a 
conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).  As to the TSA 
alone, they raised claims for failing to investigate their civil 
rights complaint in violation of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) and failing to comply with requests for information 
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy 
Act. 
                                              
4 The District Court dismissed Waldman’s claims, 
primarily for lack of standing.  While both Pellegrino’s and 
Waldman’s names appear on Appellants’ briefs, they have not 
challenged the District Court’s dismissal of Waldman from this 
action.  We therefore will treat Pellegrino as the sole appellant.   
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 In a series of orders, the District Court denied relief to 
Pellegrino on all claims with the exception of one FTCA 
property damage claim that the parties settled.  In this appeal, 
we focus primarily on Pellegrino’s FTCA claims for the 
intentional torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, and 
malicious prosecution.5 
The District Court granted summary judgment on those 
claims on the ground that TSA screeners are not covered by the 
FTCA’s law enforcement proviso because they are not 
“empowered by law to execute searches . . . for violations of 
Federal law.”  Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 09-
5505, 2014 WL 1489939, at *5, *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2014).  
While the Court recognized that TSA screeners are permitted 
to perform something that qualifies as a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment, it concluded that it was unclear whether 
“Congress intended ‘search’ in § 2680(h) to be synonymous 
with ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  
Id. at *5.  Because it found the language of the proviso 
ambiguous, the Court turned to legislative history.  The Court 
observed that “[a] review of the legislative history reveals that 
Congress, in response to ‘no-knock’ raids conducted by federal 
narcotic agents on the wrong dwellings, passed the 1974 
amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act to provide 
compensation for such victims.”  Id. at *6 (quoting Solomon v. 
                                              
5 At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the District Court first 
found that the individual defendants and the TSA were not 
proper defendants and dismissed all claims against them, 
substituting the United States as the sole defendant.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2679.  The Court then permitted the false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims to proceed 
against the United States. 
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United States, 559 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)).  
As “the law enforcement proviso was enacted as a response to 
specific eg[]regious behavior during raids conducted by federal 
law enforcement officers,” the Court concluded it “was not 
intended to be expansive enough to cover airport security 
screeners.”  Id. at *7. 
 The District Court also ruled in the Government’s favor 
on Pellegrino’s remaining claims, and Pellegrino then filed this 
appeal.6   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 1331.  See S.R.P. ex rel. 
Abunabba v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 331–32 (3d Cir. 
2012); Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 245 (3d Cir. 2004).  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s interpretation 
of the FTCA.  See Baer v. United States, 722 F.3d 168, 172 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
                                              
6 After the parties submitted their initial briefs, the Court 
appointed Paul M. Thompson of McDermott Will & Emery to 
serve as amicus curiae on behalf of Pellegrino, and Amicus and 
the Government have filed supplemental briefs addressing the 
issues presented in this case.  We express our gratitude to Mr. 
Thompson for accepting this matter pro bono and for the 
quality of his briefing and argument in this case.  Lawyers who 
act pro bono fulfill the highest service that members of the bar 
can offer to the legal profession. 
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III. Legal Background 
 A. The Federal Tort Claims Act  
 “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the 
Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”  FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).  The FTCA creates a layered 
scheme waiving and then reasserting immunity.  At the first 
level, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for “injury or loss 
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent 
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment.”  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).7  However, that broad 
waiver is limited by a number of exceptions, which we have 
construed as akin to affirmative defenses.  See Abunabba, 676 
F.3d at 333 n.2.  As relevant here, the “intentional tort 
exception”8 preserves the Government’s immunity for “[a]ny 
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  Finally, the FTCA includes an exception 
                                              
7 Prior to the 1946 passage of the FTCA, individuals 
could obtain compensation for negligent acts committed by 
federal employees through only a private bill in Congress.  The 
FTCA was designed to replace that “notoriously clumsy” 
system.  Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 (1953). 
8 This label is somewhat imprecise because § 2680(h) 
“does not remove from the FTCA’s waiver all intentional torts, 
e.g., conversion and trespass, and it encompasses certain torts, 
e.g., misrepresentation, that may arise out of negligent 
conduct.”  Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 507 n.1 (2013). 
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to that exception—the “law enforcement proviso”—which 
waives immunity for certain intentional torts committed by 
“investigative or law enforcement officers.”  Id.  That proviso 
is at issue in this case. 
 Read together, these subsections provide that while 
private citizens are barred from bringing suit against federal 
employees for many intentional torts, they may nonetheless 
bring suit for a subset of these torts—“assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious 
prosecution”—if the alleged act was committed by an 
“investigative or law enforcement officer.”  Id.  The law 
enforcement proviso defines “investigative or law enforcement 
officer” to “mean[] any officer of the United States who is 
empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to 
make arrests for violations of Federal law.”  Id. 
 Because Pellegrino asserts intentional tort claims 
arising out of the actions of TSOs, we must determine as a 
matter of statutory interpretation whether TSOs qualify as 
“investigative or law enforcement officers” such that the 
claims fall within the proviso. 
 B. Vanderklok v. United States 
 Contrary to the Government’s assertion, we did not 
resolve this issue in its favor in our recent decision in 
Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2017).  But 
that case does provide some important touchpoints for 
assessing the question now squarely before us. 
 In Vanderklok, the plaintiff brought various claims 
against a TSO, including claims under the FTCA and a claim 
under Bivens for retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First 
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Amendment.  Id. at 195.  The District Court denied the TSO’s 
qualified immunity defense to the Bivens claim, and the TSO 
appealed.  Id. at 196.  We reversed the District Court’s order in 
part, concluding that a Bivens cause of action for First 
Amendment retaliatory prosecution was not available to the 
plaintiff in those circumstances.  Id. at 209. 
 In evaluating whether it was permissible to imply this 
Bivens claim, we considered two questions: (1) whether an 
alternative process—namely, an FTCA claim—was available 
to protect the constitutional interests at stake; and (2) whether 
there were special factors counseling against implying a Bivens 
cause of action in this context.  See id. at 200.  In addressing 
the first of these issues, we noted both the District Court’s 
conclusion “that [the TSO] was not an investigative or law 
enforcement agent because he was not an ‘officer’ of the 
United States under [the FTCA’s] definition” and its reasoning 
that the FTCA distinguished between “employee[s]” and 
“officer[s],” with only the latter being used in the law 
enforcement proviso.  Id. at 203.  The District Court also 
observed that the ATSA, “which created the TSA[,] designates 
as ‘law enforcement personnel’ only those TSA agents who are 
‘(1) authorized to carry and use firearms; (2) vested with the 
degree of the police power; and (3) identifiable by appropriate 
indicia of authority.’”  Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting 49 
U.S.C. § 44903(a)(1)–(3)).  Because the TSO was not “law 
enforcement personnel” under that definition, the District 
Court determined he was an employee, not an officer, and 
therefore was not subject to the law enforcement proviso.  See 
id. 
Although we recounted this reasoning, we were careful 
to emphasize that “[t]he District Court’s decision about the 
applicability of the law enforcement proviso is not on appeal at 
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this time” and that our focus was on the availability of a Bivens 
action.  Id.  We then concluded that, even without an alternative 
process (an FTCA claim) available to the plaintiff, we would 
not imply a Bivens claim because special factors unique to the 
airport-security context counseled heavily against doing so.  
We identified several such factors: (a) TSA agents are part of 
the country’s national-security apparatus; (b) Congress is in a 
better position than the Court to recognize a new species of 
liability; and (c) TSA agents are not typically law enforcement 
officers.  Id. at 206–08.  In discussing point (c), we referred 
back to our discussion of the FTCA claim and emphasized the 
highly circumscribed and administrative nature of the TSO 
role: 
TSA employees typically are not law 
enforcement officers and do not act as such.  As 
previously discussed, only those TSA employees 
specifically designated by the Under Secretary 
with the responsibilities of an officer, in 
accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44903(a), operate 
like police officers.  As a result, line TSA 
employees are not trained on issues of probable 
cause, reasonable suspicion, and other 
constitutional doctrines that govern law 
enforcement officers.  See 49 C.F.R. § 1542.213 
(delineating mandatory training).  Instead, they 
are instructed to carry out administrative 
searches and contact local law enforcement if 
they encounter situations requiring action 
beyond their limited though important 
responsibilities.  Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 1542.215 
(providing for “[u]niformed law enforcement 
personnel in the number and manner adequate to 
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support” passenger screenings).  Since a First 
Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim 
hinges, in part, on whether the allegedly 
offending government employee had probable 
cause to take some enforcement action, a Bivens 
claim is poorly suited to address wrongs by line 
TSA employees. 
Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 208–09 (citation omitted).9 
 This ruling was one of the “portions of the opinion 
necessary to th[e] result,” and thus not dictum.  Seminole Tribe 
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996); see also In re 
Friedman’s Inc., 738 F.3d 547, 552 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining 
that a statement is not dictum if it is “necessary to our ultimate 
holding”).  However, we ruled in Vanderklok only that TSOs 
are not law enforcement officers for purposes of a Bivens 
claim.  Thus, while there may be good reasons to interpret the 
law enforcement proviso consistently with our Bivens case law, 
                                              
9 “Administrative searches” are an exception to the 
general rule that a search or seizure is unreasonable in the 
absence of individualized suspicion.  See United States v. 
Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2006).  “Suspicionless 
checkpoint searches” are one such example, and “are 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment when a court finds a 
favorable balance between ‘the gravity of the public concerns 
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances 
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with 
individual liberty.’”  Id. at 178–79 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 
540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004)).  In Hartwell, we concluded that 
TSA screenings fall into this category and constitute 
permissible administrative searches.  See id. at 181. 
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we agree with Amicus that Vanderklok addressed a different 
category of claim and is not dispositive of the question 
presented today. 
IV. Analysis of Intentional Tort FTCA Claims and the 
Law Enforcement Proviso 
 In support of their respective positions on whether 
TSOs qualify as “investigative or law enforcement officers,” 
the parties offer very different interpretations of § 2680(h)’s 
law enforcement proviso. 
Amicus contends that because the screenings performed 
by TSOs qualify as “searches” under the Fourth Amendment, 
see George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 577 (3d Cir. 2013), TSOs 
“execute searches” for purposes of the proviso.  Moreover, 
Amicus argues, the definition’s reference to “any” officer 
shows that Congress intended for the term to be construed 
broadly and that “officer” itself has a broad, elastic definition.  
See Amicus Br. at 22 (stating that “officer” is defined as “[o]ne 
who is charged by a superior power (and particularly by 
government) with the power and duty of exercising certain 
functions” (alteration in original) (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary (4th ed. 1968))).  Amicus relies, at bottom, on the 
following syllogism: (a) federal workers who are authorized to 
perform any type of search are “investigative or law 
enforcement officers”; (b) TSA screeners perform searches; 
ergo (c) TSA screeners are “investigative or law enforcement 
officers.”   
 The Government, meanwhile, argues that the law 
enforcement proviso is designed to cover only traditional 
investigative or law enforcement officers, i.e., those who 
possess criminal justice powers.  The Government contends 
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that TSA screeners have much more circumscribed powers—
as opposed to, for instance, FBI or DEA agents—and therefore 
are not covered by the proviso.  The Government also argues 
that TSOs are “employees,” not “officers,” and that the limited 
administrative searches that they perform do not constitute 
“searches” under the proviso. 
We agree with the Government.  Based on the proviso’s 
text, structure, context, purpose, and history, as well as the 
relevant case law, we are persuaded that the phrase 
“investigative or law enforcement officers” is limited in scope 
and refers only to officers with criminal law enforcement 
powers.  Because TSOs only conduct administrative searches 
and do not have such powers, they are not subject to the law 
enforcement proviso, and the Government’s sovereign 
immunity bars this action. 
A. Interpretation of the Law Enforcement 
Proviso 
  1. Text 
As in all cases in which we interpret a statute, to 
determine the scope of the phrase “investigative or law 
enforcement officer”—meaning “any officer of the United 
States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize 
evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law”—
under § 2680(h), “we look first to its language, giving the 
words used their ordinary meaning,” Levin v. United States, 
568 U.S. 503, 513 (2013) (quoting Moskal v. United States, 
498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990)).  In addition to the statutory 
language at issue, we consider “the specific context in which 
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as 
a whole.”  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); 
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see also Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2267 
(2014) (explaining that courts must “interpret the relevant 
words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory 
context, ‘structure, history, and purpose’” (quoting Maracich 
v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2209 (2013))).10  With these 
considerations in mind, we conclude that the law enforcement 
proviso covers only criminal law enforcement officers. 
 To start, we find it important that the FTCA repeatedly 
distinguishes between officers and employees.  The FTCA 
waives sovereign immunity for certain acts and omissions of 
an “employee.”  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also id. § 2671 
(“‘Employee of the government’ includes (1) officers or 
employees of any federal agency . . . .”); id. § 2680(a) 
(discretionary-function exception referring to “an employee”).  
However, the law enforcement proviso refers not to 
“employees,” but to “investigative or law enforcement 
officers.”  Id. § 2680(h) (emphasis added).  The proviso again 
uses that term in defining “investigative or law enforcement 
officers” to mean any “officer” with the powers specified.  Id.  
Given that Congress used the word “officer” rather than 
“employee” in the proviso, we are reluctant to interpret 
“officer” in a way that would conflate those terms.  See 
                                              
10 See also United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299, 308 
(3d Cir. 2014) (“In matters of statutory interpretation, the plain 
meaning of statutory language is often illuminated by 
considering not only the particular statutory language at issue, 
but also the structure of the section in which the key language 
is found, and the design of the statute as a whole and its object.” 
(alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Tupone, 442 
F.3d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 2006))). 
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generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 
(2004) (referring to “the usual rule that when the legislature 
uses certain language in one part of the statute and different 
language in another, the court assumes different meanings 
were intended” (citation omitted)).  This militates against 
Amicus’s interpretation of this term, which is materially 
indistinguishable from the word “employee.”11 
 We find additional support in the canon noscitur a 
sociis, which “implements the idea that the meaning of a word 
should be determined by considering the words with which it 
is associated in context.”  Flores v. Att’y Gen., 856 F.3d 280, 
295 n.80 (3d Cir. 2017).  Each of the powers listed in the law 
enforcement proviso—“to execute searches, to seize evidence, 
or to make arrests for violations of Federal law”—has criminal 
law connotations.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 34 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168, 1179 (D. Colo. 2014) (“Each of these functions 
are commonly understood to be traditional law enforcement 
functions.”).  For instance, “execute a search” is a phrase 
                                              
11 The dissent suggests that we render the remainder of 
the law enforcement proviso a nullity by interpreting 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” to refer to criminal 
law enforcement officers.  To the contrary, our reading is the 
one that gives meaning to both components of Congress’s 
definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer”: a 
person who is designated an “officer” and who performs 
traditional criminal law enforcement functions.  In any event, 
it is not unusual for Congress to define “law enforcement 
officer” by reference to the officer’s duties, even if those duties 
all sound in criminal law.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20); 12 
U.S.C. § 248(q)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 245(c); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1515(a)(4). 
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typically used when a warrant is involved, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3109 (explaining when an officer may break a door or 
window in order “to execute a search warrant”), and Congress 
generally does not use this phrase when granting employees 
the power to perform administrative searches, see, e.g., 29 
U.S.C. § 657(a)(2) (providing that Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) inspectors may “inspect and 
investigate during regular working hours and at other 
reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a 
reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all 
pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, 
equipment, and materials therein”).  The other powers—“to 
seize evidence” and, especially, “to make arrests for violations 
of Federal law”—also sound in criminal law.  See, e.g., Arizona 
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (“It is well established that 
under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in 
plain view without a warrant[.]” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971))).  Each 
of these phrases helps give meaning to the others, reinforcing 
that the phrase “to execute searches” refers to the power to 
search based on individualized suspicion, not merely to 
conduct an administrative search, and that the term 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” therefore means 
those officers who perform criminal law enforcement 
functions.12 
                                              
12 Our dissenting colleague contends there is no need to 
resort to canons of statutory construction because the text of 
the proviso is plain and unambiguous.  Would it were so.  
Instead, our respective reasonable but divergent 
interpretations, as well as the split among the district courts that 
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 It is also significant that the law enforcement proviso 
covers just a subset of the torts listed in the intentional tort 
exception.  While the intentional tort exception preserves 
immunity for the torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with 
                                              
have considered the matter, see infra note 25, attest to its 
ambiguity.  The dissent also posits specifically that the noscitur 
a sociis canon is inapplicable because the statute is phrased in 
the disjunctive, but even in that context, as the Supreme Court 
observed in Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., this canon is “often 
wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in 
order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of 
Congress.”  367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961).  There, considering the 
phrase “exploration, discovery, or prospecting,” the Court 
concluded that because “[t]he three words in conjunction . . . 
all describe income-producing activity in the oil and gas and 
mining industries,” “‘discovery’ . . . means only the discovery 
of mineral resources.”  Id. at 305, 307.  And because those 
terms shared a “core of meaning,” providing “a clue that it was 
those industries Congress had in mind when it drafted the 
provision,” the Court found noscitur a sociis “illuminating.”  
Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. 
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 289 n.7 (2010) (discussing Jarecki).  
Such is also the case here, where there is ambiguity as to 
whether those who conduct TSA screenings are “officer[s] . . . 
empowered by law to execute searches,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), 
and where interpreting that phrase to include such 
administrative searches risks giving “unintended breadth” to 
the law enforcement proviso, Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307. 
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contract rights, the law enforcement proviso waives immunity 
for only half of these—assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  In other words, the law enforcement 
proviso waives immunity for the types of tort claims typically 
asserted against criminal law enforcement officers, while 
preserving immunity for other tort claims that are asserted 
more broadly against federal employees.  This further supports 
our conclusion that the law enforcement proviso is designed to 
cover only criminal law enforcement officers.   
 Our textual analysis is further buttressed by the fact that 
the words to be defined here—“investigative or law 
enforcement officer”—typically refer to criminal law 
enforcement.  See generally United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460, 474 (2010) (“[A]n unclear definitional phrase may take 
meaning from the term to be defined.”).  We have identified 
only one other context in which Congress has used the phrase 
“investigative or law enforcement officer.”  That is the context 
of criminal wiretapping and electronic tracking: The phrase is 
repeated throughout Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, and 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 
which amended Title III and added new provisions governing 
“pen registers and trap and trace devices,” see 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3121–3127.13  Title III provides standards for when 
                                              
13 In addition, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1809 and 1827 criminalize 
unauthorized engagement in or disclosure of information from 
electronic surveillance or physical searches under color of law, 
but carve out an affirmative defense where the defendant is “a 
law enforcement or investigative officer” who engaged in the 
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“investigative or law enforcement officers” may intercept and 
use private communications, see generally Gelbard v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972), and the ECPA does the same 
for the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices.  These 
statutes concern the acquisition of evidence for purposes of 
criminal law investigations, as Title III’s definition of 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” makes clear: 
“‘Investigative or law enforcement officer’ means any officer 
of the United States or of a State or political subdivision 
thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of 
or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and 
any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in 
the prosecution of such offenses.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(7).14 
                                              
surveillance in the course of his official duties and pursuant to 
a warrant or court order.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1809(b), 1827(b). 
14 In the Title III context, the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) has determined that the powers of an “investigative . . . 
officer” are not coextensive with those of a “law enforcement 
officer” but that both terms carry criminal law connotations.  
To determine whether DOJ agents are “investigative or law 
enforcement officers” per 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7), as required for 
them to access communications intercepted under the statute, 
the OLC noted that “the definition is phrased throughout in the 
disjunctive—investigative or law enforcement officer, 
empowered to conduct investigations or to make arrests.”  14 
Op. O.L.C. 107, 108 (1990).  Based on this disjunctive, the 
OLC reasoned that “it seems plain that Congress intended the 
term ‘investigative officers’ to be broad enough to include 
officials who participate in investigations but do not have arrest 
authority.”  Id.  In the same breath, however, the OLC 
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 Likewise, while Congress has used the phrase “law 
enforcement officer” much more frequently, the term 
invariably refers to individuals who are involved in criminal 
law enforcement.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 248(q)(4) (defining 
“law enforcement officers” for purposes of section authorizing 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to 
designate personnel to protect bank premises, carry firearms, 
and make arrests); 18 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1) (defining “[f]ederal 
law enforcement officer” for purposes of statute criminalizing 
efforts to impede, intimidate, or interfere with officials, judges, 
and law enforcement officers); 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(4) 
(defining “law enforcement officer” for purposes of witness-
tampering statute).  We have not found any instance in which 
this term covers an individual who performs only 
administrative duties.15 
 While none of these various textual arguments is, 
standing alone, dispositive, each points toward the same 
conclusion: The law enforcement proviso covers only officers 
who are engaged in criminal law enforcement. 
                                              
emphasized the criminal law enforcement functions of the 
investigative officers in question, stating that “the only 
discussion in the legislative history of the term ‘investigative 
officers’ indicates that the term encompasses all officers who 
carry out any law enforcement duties relating to offenses 
enumerated in [18 U.S.C. §] 2516.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
15 While we acknowledge, of course, that these words 
do not necessarily hold the same meaning across statutes, the 
regularity with which these words are used in the criminal law 
context does bear on their meaning here. 
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  2. Purpose 
 Our reading is also supported by our understanding of 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the law enforcement proviso.  
See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) 
(“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the 
whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the 
statute . . . .”); see also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 
(2015) (adopting the interpretation of a statute that “can fairly 
be read consistent with what we see as Congress’s plan”).  
 Critically, interpreting “officer” to have a criminal law 
component avoids an unprincipled expansion of the 
Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity.  Countless 
federal employees are empowered to perform “searches.”  The 
Secretary of Commerce, for instance, may “make such 
inspection of the books, records, and other writings and 
premises and property of any person” whose activities relate to 
weather modification, 15 U.S.C. § 330c(a); FDA inspectors 
may make “examination and inspection of all meat food 
products prepared for commerce in any slaughtering, meat-
canning, salting, packing, rendering, or similar establishment” 
and “shall have access at all times, by day or night, whether the 
establishment be operated or not, to every part of said 
establishment,” 21 U.S.C. § 606(a); and EPA employees may 
enter establishments where hazardous wastes “have been 
generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or transported from” 
and “inspect and obtain samples” of any such wastes, 42 
U.S.C. § 6927(a).16  Drug tests also constitute searches under 
                                              
16 See also 21 U.S.C. § 880 (authorizing entry of 
premises and inspection of finished and unfinished drugs, 
chemicals, and other substances and materials); 42 U.S.C. 
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the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union 
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor 
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989).  In short, reading 
the proviso to include administrative searches would sweep 
into its ambit large swaths of the federal workforce, producing 
an unprecedented expansion of the United States’ tort liability.  
While Amicus expressly argued that these types of employees 
should be covered by the law enforcement proviso, see 
Corrected Tr. of Oral Arg. at 8:3–9:10, we will not impute to 
Congress so significant a waiver of sovereign immunity 
without far more explicit evidence of its intent, see King, 135 
S. Ct. at 2494 (rejecting a proposed interpretation of a statutory 
scheme because “[i]t is implausible that Congress meant the 
Act to operate in this manner”). 
  3. Legislative History 
 Legislative history cannot overcome the clear language 
of a statute, but it can “play a confirmatory role in resolving 
ambiguity when statutory language and structure support a 
given interpretation.”  G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 
802 F.3d 601, 621–22 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Catwell v. Att’y 
Gen., 623 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, the legislative 
history of the law enforcement proviso confirms our 
interpretation of the text. 
                                              
§ 263b(g) (authorizing entry and inspection of mammography 
facilities); 42 U.S.C. § 5413 (authorizing entry and inspection 
of factories and warehouses where manufactured homes are 
manufactured, stored, or held for sale); 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) 
(authorizing entry and inspection of premises of any person 
who owns or operates an emission source). 
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Of particular note, Congress contemporaneously 
considered three bills to amend the broad immunity preserved 
by the intentional tort exception—S. 2558, 93d Cong. (1973); 
H.R. 8245, 93d Cong. (1973); and H.R. 10439, 93d Cong. 
(1973)—with Members referring regularly to the other bills as 
each was debated.  Two of the bills (S. 2558 and H.R. 10439) 
waived sovereign immunity for the specified intentional torts 
for all federal employees.  Only one—H.R. 8245—limited the 
waiver of immunity to “investigative or law enforcement 
officers.”  H.R. 8245 was the bill eventually signed into law, 
codifying the law enforcement proviso in its present form.  See 
Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)).  See generally John C. Boger 
et al., The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts 
Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. Rev. 497, 
510–17 (1976). 
 Three other aspects of the legislative history also reflect 
Congress’s intention to limit the proviso to criminal law 
enforcement officers.  First, Congress was spurred to action by 
two ill-conceived raids conducted by federal narcotics agents 
in Collinsville, Illinois.  In these raids, the agents, acting 
without warrants, kicked in doors without warning, drew 
weapons, and terrorized the residents, only to determine later 
that they had entered the wrong houses.  As one committee 
report stressed, “[t]here is no effective legal remedy against the 
Federal Government for the actual physical damage, mu[ch] 
less the pain, suffering and humiliation to which the 
Collinsville families have been subjected.”  S. Rep. No. 93-
588, at 2 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 
2790.  Members of Congress returned again and again to the 
problem of these “no knock” raids and the need to create a 
meaningful remedy for the victims.  See, e.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 
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5287 (1974) (statement of Rep. Wiggins) (“I believe the 
Members ought to realize that this Senate amendment was an 
emotional response to the unfortunate Collinsville case . . . .”).  
Thus, the driving concern behind the enactment of H.R. 8245 
was the potential for abuse of the devastating powers wielded 
by criminal law enforcement. 
 Second, Members of Congress explicitly discussed the 
fact that H.R. 8245, unlike the other bills, would not cover 
federal employees who perform administrative searches.  
Some observed that H.R. 8245 “only applies to law 
enforcement officers.  It does not apply to any other Federal 
employees that might violate the rights of an individual.”  120 
Cong. Rec. 5287 (statements of Reps. Donohue and Wiggins).  
Others, urging passage of the bills that waived immunity for all 
federal employees, lamented that H.R. 8245, by limiting the 
waiver to “investigative or law enforcement officers,” would 
provide no remedy for assaults committed by those who 
perform only administrative searches: 
I can give you an illustration.  We have 
Department of Agriculture investigators who go 
into look at books and records.  We have Defense 
Department auditors to look at books and 
records.  I can see where we can get in a dispute 
where records should be shown or not shown and 
a report shown by mistake and the contractor 
takes it away and says you shouldn’t have seen 
that and some sort of assault occurs.  The assault 
may not be intentionally inflicted to create any 
more damage than to keep him away.  He may 
trip over backward and hit his head and fracture 
his skull and even die.  They are not law 
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enforcement officers even under this definition.  
They don’t qualify. 
Federal Tort Claims Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 10439 
Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 18 (1974) 
[hereinafter H.R. 10439 Hearings] (statement of Irving Jaffe, 
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen.); see also id. at 15 (statement of 
Jaffe) (“It should be noted that . . . H.R. 8245 is confined in its 
applicability to Federal investigative or law enforcement 
officers, while . . . H.R. 10439 would waive the sovereign 
immunity of the United States as to the same acts or omissions 
on the part of all Government employees.”). 
Third, when the drafters selected for the proviso what 
they characterized as “the types of tort[s] most frequently 
arising out of activities of Federal law enforcement officers,”17 
they selected those torts (assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution) 
typically claimed against traditional law enforcement officers 
performing criminal law functions. 
 The criminal law boundaries of the law enforcement 
proviso are also reinforced by the legislative history of a related 
statutory provision that incorporates the proviso: 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3724.  That section authorizes the Attorney General to settle, 
for up to $50,000, claims brought specifically against an 
“investigative or law enforcement officer as defined in [the law 
                                              
17 H.R. 10439 Hearings at 14 (statement of Jaffe); see 
also 119 Cong. Rec. 33,496 (1973) (giving verbatim 
explanation in reference to S. 2558). 
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enforcement proviso of] section 2680(h) . . . who is employed 
by the Department of Justice acting within the scope of 
employment.”  31 U.S.C. § 3724(a).18  As originally drafted, 
§ 3724 was written to cover the settlement of claims arising 
from the actions of “any officer or employee of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation or other law enforcement component 
of the Department of Justice.”  H.R. Rep. No. 101-46, at 7–8 
(1989) (emphasis added).  But Brent Hatch, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General of the DOJ Civil Division, testified that this 
language was “too vague,” as it might then apply to “the 
litigating arms of the Antitrust Division or of the Civil Rights 
Division, for example,” whose functions “are aimed at the 
enforcement of the law.”  Id. at 8.  According to Hatch, “the 
intent of the bill is narrower” and thus would be better captured 
by the FTCA language allowing compensation for certain 
injuries caused by “investigative or law enforcement officers.”  
Id.  Congress proceeded to adopt this construction.19 
                                              
18 An almost identical, subsequently enacted provision 
permits the Treasury Secretary to settle claims for damage or 
loss caused by “an investigative or law enforcement officer 
. . . who is employed by the Customs Service and acting within 
the scope of his or her employment.”  19 U.S.C. § 1630. 
19 The dissent discounts the corroborative value of 
§ 3724’s legislative history because it reflects that personnel 
such as “a DEA Agent, . . . a Border Patrolman, or a Deputy 
Marshal” who also perform administrative searches are not 
insulated from the proviso’s scope.  Dissent at 45 (quoting H.R. 
Rep. No. 101-46, at 7).  However, the fact that traditional 
criminal law enforcement officers may also have occasion to 
perform administrative searches does not alter the fact that they 
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 In sum, the legislative history of the proviso, as well as 
§ 3724, fortifies our conclusion that Congress was focused on 
violations caused during criminal law enforcement activities 
and intentionally designed a remedy for those violations. 
  4. Case Law 
 Our interpretation of the law enforcement proviso is 
also consistent with our case law and that of other Courts of 
Appeals.   
In Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004), 
for example, we categorically excluded classes of employees 
from the law enforcement proviso.  There, the plaintiff filed an 
FTCA action concerning injuries he sustained when a Mine 
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector slammed 
his face into a briefcase lying on a desk and asserted that “his 
claim fit[] within the FTCA’s special treatment of assaults by 
investigative or law enforcement officers.”  Id. at 560.  We first 
observed that the law enforcement proviso did not apply 
because the mine inspector did not commit the torts in the 
course of executing a search, seizure, or arrest, as we 
previously required under Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 
868, 872 (3d Cir. 1986).  But we went on to explain that, even 
if Pooler was incorrectly decided, the mine inspector was not 
an “investigative or law enforcement officer” for the 
independent reason that “employees of administrative 
agencies, no matter what investigative conduct they are 
                                              
are empowered to conduct criminal law enforcement functions 
and in no way casts doubt on the textual and historical reasons 
to believe that § 2680(h) and § 3724 exclude from their reach 
those who perform only administrative searches. 
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involved in, do not come within the § 2680(h) exception.”  
Matsko, 372 F.3d at 560.  In support of this conclusion, we 
cited EEOC v. First National Bank of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004, 
1007–08 (5th Cir. 1980), in which, we explained, the Fifth 
Circuit had refused “to apply the exception to an Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission agent,” Matsko, 372 
F.3d at 560. 
Matsko remains the law of this Circuit20 and reflects the 
line we have drawn, in construing the law enforcement proviso, 
between administrative personnel performing solely 
administrative functions and those—whether employed by an 
administrative agency or a law enforcement agency—
expressly designated law enforcement officers or assigned law 
enforcement duties.  Indeed, the MSHA inspector in Matsko 
had “authority to inspect mines and investigate possible 
violations,” id., just as the EEOC agent in First National Bank 
of Jackson had “access to, for the purpose of examination, and 
                                              
20 In Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013), the 
Supreme Court abrogated Pooler, holding that the torts 
covered by the proviso were not restricted to those committed 
during the course of a search, seizure, or arrest.  Id. at 57.  The 
Government there conceded that the named federal officers 
constituted “investigative or law enforcement officers,” id. at 
55 n.3, so the question before the Court was when a tort 
committed by such an officer would fall within the proviso and 
the Court did not have occasion to address who meets the 
definition of an “investigative or law enforcement officer,” see 
id.  Millbrook thus does nothing to disturb our conclusion in 
Matsko that employees of administrative agencies do not meet 
that definition. 
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the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated 
or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment 
practices,” 614 F.2d at 1007–08 (citation omitted).  Those 
employees were authorized to conduct administrative searches, 
but because their jobs did not include criminal law enforcement 
responsibilities, they were considered to fall outside the law 
enforcement proviso.21 
That approach is also consistent with decisions of other 
Courts of Appeals, which have treated only those performing 
criminal law enforcement duties as “investigative or law 
enforcement officers” under the proviso.  For example, the 
D.C. Circuit has concluded that postal inspectors, who are 
empowered to investigate criminal matters, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3061, are covered by the proviso.  See Moore v. United 
States, 213 F.3d 705, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  Courts have also 
ruled that the proviso covers customs officers, see Nurse v. 
United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2000), 
Veterans’ Administration (VA) police officers, see Celestine v. 
United States, 841 F.2d 851, 852–53 (8th Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam), U.S. Marshals, see Hoston v. Silbert, 681 F.2d 876, 
                                              
21 As discussed in more detail below, in Vanderklok, we 
reiterated this distinction, relying on the ATSA’s separate 
designation of “employees” and “law enforcement officers” to 
conclude that “TSA employees typically are not law 
enforcement officers and do not act as such.”  868 F.3d at 208.  
Although we were assessing there only whether TSOs were 
law enforcement officers for purposes of Bivens claims, we 
expressly recognized the cabined authority of TSOs, in contrast 
with the more expansive powers of law enforcement officers.  
See id. at 208–09. 
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879 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam), Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) agents, see Caban v. United 
States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1234 (2d Cir. 1982), FBI agents, see 
Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1981), and 
federal correctional officers, see Hernandez v. Lattimore, 612 
F.2d 61, 64 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979).  Each of those individuals 
participates in criminal law enforcement.22 
 Likewise, in Bunch v. United States, the Seventh Circuit 
recently held that there were genuine disputes of material fact 
as to whether a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(ATF) forensic chemist fell within the proviso precisely 
because the forensic chemist may have been an “ATF officer” 
authorized to participate in criminal investigations under 18 
U.S.C. § 846 and its implementing regulations, and his job 
duties appeared to “include[] the identification of relevant 
evidence for colleagues during crime-scene investigations.”  
880 F.3d 938, 943, 945 (7th Cir. 2018).  To be sure, that court 
rejected the notion that “executing searches” is limited to 
executing search warrants, id. at 945, and highlighted that the 
                                              
22 While INS agents have some civil responsibilities, 
they are also empowered “to make arrests for felonies which 
have been committed and which are cognizable under any law 
of the United States regulating the admission, exclusion, 
expulsion, or removal of aliens.”  8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(4); cf. 
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212–13 (2018) (plurality 
opinion) (explaining that removal proceedings in some ways 
resemble criminal actions); Mateo v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 228, 
232 (3d Cir. 2017) (same).  Likewise, Bureau of Prisons 
officers are entitled to carry firearms and make arrests for 
violations of federal law, see 18 U.S.C. § 3050, as are customs 
officers, see 19 U.S.C. § 1589a. 
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proviso applies to both “investigative and law-enforcement 
officers” who execute searches, id. at 944.  But it relied on the 
fact that ATF officers are authorized under Title 18—the 
federal criminal code—“to inspect the site of any accident, or 
fire, in which there is reason to believe that explosive materials 
were involved,” id. at 943 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 846 (1994)), 
and it offered, as examples of the types of searches covered by 
the proviso, searches incident to arrest, protective sweeps, and 
searches conducted pursuant to the automobile exception, id. 
at 945—i.e., searches conducted by criminal law enforcement 
officers. 
 On the other hand, the Courts of Appeals have held that 
the proviso does not cover positions that lack a criminal law 
component.  In First National Bank of Jackson, for example, 
the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the proviso to EEOC agents, 
explicitly distinguishing between federal employees who 
“have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right 
to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or 
proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment 
practices,” and “investigative or law enforcement officers” 
who have the power to “execute searches.”  614 F.2d at 1007–
08 (citation omitted).  Similarly, in Wilson v. United States, the 
Second Circuit held that parole officers do not qualify.  959 
F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam).  While acknowledging 
that parole officers have limited authority to seize evidence, the 
court determined that because that power “depends on the 
consent of the person from whom the evidence is to be taken, 
however, parole officers lack the seizure power contemplated 
by section 2680(h), and thus cannot be considered law 
enforcement personnel.”  Id.  The Courts of Appeals have also 
concluded that the law enforcement proviso does not cover 
federal prosecutors, see Moore, 213 F.3d at 710, security 
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guards, see Solomon, 559 F.2d at 310, or doctors at a VA 
hospital, see Johnson v. United States, 547 F.2d 688, 691 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  In short, consistent with Matsko, our 
Sister Circuits have consistently interpreted the proviso to 
include federal officers who are involved in criminal law 
enforcement and to exclude federal employees who are not.23 
* * * 
Based on these various indicia of meaning—the law 
enforcement proviso’s text, structure, context, purpose, and 
history, as well as relevant case law—we are persuaded that 
the phrase “investigative or law enforcement officers” refers 
only to criminal law enforcement officers, not to federal 
employees who conduct only administrative searches. 
                                              
23 Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 
abrogated on other grounds by Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, is not to 
the contrary.  In that case, the D.C. Circuit was asked to 
determine whether the Chief of the United States National 
Central Bureau was covered by the law enforcement proviso 
notwithstanding the fact that his “present duties d[id] not 
involve frontline law enforcement work.”  Id. at 764.  He was, 
the court concluded, because his position was unquestionably 
that of a criminal law enforcement officer: He was classified 
as a “criminal investigator[]” and the Government had 
stipulated that he served in a position that could be staffed by 
only “trained law enforcement personnel.”  Id. 
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 B. The Proviso’s Application to TSA Screeners 
 Given our holding as to the scope of the proviso, we 
have little difficulty concluding it does not cover TSA 
screeners.  No Court of Appeals has yet decided the question 
precedentially,24 and district courts have reached different 
conclusions.25  However, as indicated in Vanderklok, 
confirmed in the ATSA (the TSA’s founding statute), and 
demonstrated in practice, TSA screeners conduct only 
administrative searches, are not criminal law enforcement 
officers, and thus do not qualify as “investigative or law 
enforcement officers” under the FTCA. 
 As a starting point, we draw valuable guidance from 
Vanderklok.  As we explained there, “TSA employees typically 
are not law enforcement officers and do not act as such.”  
Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 208.  Underpinning that rationale was 
                                              
24 See Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 568 F. App’x 690, 
701 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that the law 
enforcement proviso does not cover TSA screeners).  Pursuant 
to 11th Cir. R. 36-2, unpublished opinions of the Eleventh 
Circuit “may be cited as persuasive authority.” 
25 Compare, e.g., Hernandez, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 1182 
(holding that the proviso does not cover TSA screeners), 
Weinraub v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 2d 258, 266 (E.D.N.C. 
2012) (same), and Coulter v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 
07-4894, 2008 WL 4416454, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2008) 
(same), with Armato v. Doe 1, No. CV-11-02462-PHX-ROS, 
2012 WL 13027047, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2012) (holding 
that the proviso covers TSA screeners). 
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our prior case law upholding TSA screenings as permissible 
suspicionless checkpoint searches under the administrative 
search doctrine.  See George, 738 F.3d at 577; United States v. 
Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178–81 (3d Cir. 2006).  Against that 
backdrop, we explained that TSA screeners have limited 
authority: “[T]hey are instructed to carry out administrative 
searches and contact local law enforcement if they encounter 
situations requiring action beyond their limited though 
important responsibilities.”  Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 209. 
Reinforcing the distinction we recognized in 
Vanderklok, the ATSA frequently distinguishes between 
“employees” who conduct administrative searches and “law 
enforcement officers.”  For example, it specifies that the 
“screening[s]” conducted by TSOs “shall be carried out by a 
Federal Government employee (as defined in section 2105 of 
title 5, United States Code).”  49 U.S.C. § 44901(a).26  This is 
                                              
26 We recognize that 5 U.S.C. § 2105 defines 
“employee” to cover both an “officer” and an individual who 
has been appointed to civil service in a certain specified 
manner.  However, to be an “officer,” the individual must be 
“required by law to be appointed in the civil service by . . . the 
head of an Executive agency.”  Id. § 2104(a)(1).  As the parties 
agreed at oral argument, TSA screeners are not appointed by 
the head of an executive agency and are therefore not “officers” 
under Title 5’s definition.  See Corrected Tr. of Oral Arg. at 
23:3–4.  While the dissent correctly points out that § 2104 is 
underinclusive in that a few categories of “investigative or law 
enforcement officers” traditionally covered by the proviso are 
not appointed by the head of an executive agency, we cannot 
agree that we should therefore disregard the statutory 
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in contrast to 49 U.S.C. § 114(p), which permits the TSA 
administrator to designate particular TSA employees as “law 
enforcement officer[s]” empowered to “carry a firearm,” 
“make an arrest,” and “seek and execute warrants for arrest or 
seizure of evidence,” functions that squarely place them within 
the law enforcement proviso.27  Those law enforcement 
                                              
definition of “officer” or the distinction Congress has drawn 
between “officers” and “employees.”  We hew more closely to 
Congress’s intention by acknowledging its definition and 
including a small number of additional traditional criminal law 
enforcement officers within the proviso than by setting that 
definition aside entirely. 
27 Although § 114(p) is phrased in the conjunctive while 
the proviso is phrased in the disjunctive, § 114(p) remains 
instructive in determining who constitutes a “law enforcement 
officer” under the proviso because it reflects Congress’s own 
distinction between TSA screeners and “law enforcement 
officer[s]” in Title 49, which tracks its distinction between 
“employees” and “officers” in the FTCA. 
Other analogous statutes, such as that governing Postal 
Inspectors, likewise preserve the text-based distinction 
between regular employees and officers by separately 
denominating the law enforcement arm of the agency.  See, 
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a) (discussing “Postal Inspectors and 
other agents of the United States Postal Service designated by 
the Board of Governors to investigate criminal matters”).  We 
note too that Congress has expressly provided that certain 
employees qualify as “investigative or law enforcement 
officers” where their classification as such might otherwise be 
uncertain, such as personnel designated by the Secretary of the 
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officers are required to be stationed throughout airports to 
support TSOs and fulfill precisely those functions that TSOs 
have neither the authority nor the expertise to fulfill.  See id. 
§ 44901(h); 49 C.F.R. § 1542.215.  Such distinctions between 
TSOs and law enforcement officers recur throughout the 
statute.  Compare 49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(2) (providing that the 
Under Secretary is responsible for “hiring and retention of 
security screening personnel”), id. § 44901(a) (explaining that 
screenings will be performed by an “employee”), id. 
§ 44935(e)–(f) (describing training programs, hiring 
qualifications, and employment standards for “[s]ecurity 
screeners”), and id. § 44936(a) (requiring background 
investigation of a “security screener”), with id. § 114(p) 
(describing “law enforcement officer[s]”), id. § 44901(h)(1) 
(requiring the deployment of “law enforcement personnel” at 
screening locations), id. § 44903(a) (defining “law 
enforcement personnel”), and id. § 44922 (permitting the 
Under Secretary to deputize “State and local law enforcement 
officers”). 
Despite this clear statutory distinction, Amicus argues 
that TSOs must qualify as “law enforcement officers” because 
of their title—they are “transportation security officers”—and 
because they wear a badge that labels them as “officers.”  We 
are not persuaded that the word “officer” has this talismanic 
property, and it would be surprising indeed if such a superficial 
                                              
Interior and the Secretary of Commerce to enforce federal laws 
relating to fish and wildlife, who qualify as “investigative or 
law enforcement officers” for FTCA purposes under the 
express terms of their authorizing statute.  See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 742l(b).  Congress made no such provision in the ATSA for 
TSA screeners. 
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gloss were sufficient to trigger a waiver of federal sovereign 
immunity.  There are many jobs that have the word “officer” 
in the title, such as “chief executive officer” or “title officer,” 
but they unquestionably are not “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” positions.  On the other hand, other jobs, 
like “special agent” or “postal inspector,” do not have the word 
“officer” in the title, but they nonetheless qualify as 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” positions.  Indeed, 
Amicus’s argument, if anything, cuts the other way, for as we 
noted previously, TSOs were originally called “screeners,” and 
their title was changed in 2005 merely as part of an effort to 
improve employee incentives and “upward mobility 
opportunities within [the] profession.”28  Specifically, it 
appears that the title change and related adjustments were 
intended to “give TSOs an opportunity to . . . apply for DHS 
law enforcement positions”—further undermining the notion 
that TSOs already constitute a species of law enforcement 
officer.  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-299, 
Aviation Security 56 (2007) (emphasis added).  Thus, neither 
the TSO title nor the badge (which TSOs apparently began 
wearing two years after the conduct at issue in this case, see 
Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., supra note 28) speaks to 
                                              
28 Screening Hearing at 7 (statement of Edmund “Kip” 
Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security 
Administration); see Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., 
Transportation Security Officers Have Renewed Focus and 
New Look on Seventh Anniversary of 9/11 (Sept. 11, 2008), 
https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2008/09/11/transportation-
security-officers-have-renewed-focus-and-new-look-seventh. 
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the nature of the position or the scope of the accompanying 
authority. 
 The statutory distinction between TSOs and law 
enforcement officers is also meaningful as a matter of practice, 
as demonstrated by TSA Management Directive No. 100.4 
(Sept. 1, 2009), filed by Pellegrino, entitled “Transportation 
Security Searches.”  That directive separately defines “law 
enforcement officer,” “TSA law enforcement officer,” and 
“transportation security officer,” and it stresses the limits of the 
authority of a “transportation security officer”: TSOs may not 
perform screenings for the purpose of “detect[ing] evidence of 
crimes unrelated to transportation security.”  Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.A(4).  
If a TSO does discover such evidence, he or she is required to 
alert a supervisor or a law enforcement official.  The TSO can 
“request[]” the individual to wait for law enforcement to arrive, 
but the individual is nevertheless “free to leave the checkpoint 
once applicable screening requirements have been completed 
successfully.”  Id. ¶ 6.A(4).  By contrast, “TSA law 
enforcement officers,” and only “TSA law enforcement 
officers,” may engage in law enforcement activities, including 
investigations, detentions, and searches that “are not limited to 
administrative or special needs searches.”  Id. ¶ 6.D. 
Recognizing that TSA screeners conduct 
administrative, not criminal searches thus not only respects the 
distinction Congress has made between “employees” and “law 
enforcement officers” in the FTCA, it also reflects the different 
job responsibilities and training of TSA “screeners” and “law 
enforcement officers” prescribed by the ATSA and agency 
policy.  As we explained in Vanderklok, unlike criminal law 
enforcement officers, “line TSA employees are not trained on 
issues of probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and other 
constitutional doctrines that govern law enforcement officers.”  
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868 F.3d at 208.  Put differently, TSOs, like most 
administrative employees, do not receive training on the 
specific constitutional doctrines and legal standards relevant to 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of 
process, and malicious prosecution—the torts covered by the 
law enforcement proviso.  And that follows logically from the 
fact that doctrines like probable cause, as we described in 
Vanderklok, while of central importance to criminal law 
enforcement officers, are largely irrelevant to a TSO’s job.  
Acknowledging that TSOs are not law enforcement officers 
under the proviso has the added value of maintaining this 
practical coherence. 
Although all of these indicators—our case law, the 
TSA’s governing statute, and agency policy and practice—
confirm that TSOs conduct only routine administrative 
searches, the dissent argues that TSA screenings constitute 
“searches for violations of federal law because they are 
directed to illegal and prohibited items on passenger aircraft.”  
Dissent at 13.  But the fact that screenings are searches for 
prohibited items only points up why they are not searches “for 
violations of federal law”: Screenings are aimed at items that 
must be removed before boarding—not at particular 
individuals—and their purpose is “an administrative purpose, 
namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives 
aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings,” United 
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 
1973))—not to gather evidence of a crime with an eye toward 
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criminal prosecution.29  Although a screening might prompt a 
TSO to refer an individual to criminal authorities for such 
investigation and prosecution where that administrative search 
happens to turn up evidence of a crime, screenings themselves 
are not conducted for that purpose and we could not have 
upheld them in Hartwell under the administrative search 
doctrine as suspicionless checkpoint searches if they were.  See 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000) (“We 
have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary 
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing.”); see also Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 
(2013) (explaining that a police officer must have probable 
cause to conduct a search for “contraband or evidence of a 
crime”). 
Nor are we persuaded that airport screenings are so 
distinct from other administrative searches that they should be 
treated differently under the proviso.  The dissenting opinion 
                                              
29 Moreover, most of the prohibited items for which 
TSOs search are perfectly legal to possess in other contexts.  
See What Can I Bring?, Transp. Sec. Admin., https://
www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/all (last 
visited July 6, 2018).  Thus, if an individual is found with a 
prohibited item, the TSA can impose only civil penalties: 
“Criminal penalties and fines are different and wholly separate 
from the civil penalties assessed by TSA,” and “[r]eferral for 
criminal investigation and enforcement is appropriate where 
there appears to be a violation of criminal laws.”  Enforcement 
Sanction Guidance Policy, Transp. Sec. Admin., 
https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement_sanction_
guidance_policy.pdf (last visited July 6, 2018); see also 49 
C.F.R. § 1503.401. 
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contends that because TSA screeners are uniquely empowered 
by 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(5) to conduct “a physical search 
together with manifest verification,” the searches they conduct, 
unlike most administrative searches, are indistinguishable 
from Terry stops conducted by traditional criminal law 
enforcement officers.  That offers a basis, according to the 
dissent, to bring TSA screeners within the proviso without 
sweeping in all other employees who conduct administrative 
searches. 
The problem with this approach is that it mistakes the 
subject matter of § 44901(g)(5) and is inconsistent with our 
precedent.  For its part, § 44901(g)(5) does not authorize TSOs 
to conduct physical searches of passengers.  Instead, that 
provision exclusively addresses searches of cargo.  See 49 
U.S.C. § 44901(g)(1).  And while a TSO’s “[s]creening of 
individuals and property” can include “the inspection of 
individuals, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo,” 
49 C.F.R. § 1546.207(a), a pat-down conducted as part of a 
screening is not analogous to a Terry stop.  Terry stops require 
reasonable, articulable suspicion, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 30 (1968), and are directed to specific individuals; TSA 
screenings are not.  As we observed in the analogous context 
of border searches, “patdowns, frisks, [and] luggage searches” 
in connection with screenings for entry are “routine” and 
“involv[e] neither a high expectation of privacy nor a seriously 
invasive search.”  United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 485–
86 (3d Cir. 2008).  And as we explained in Hartwell—
specifically addressing TSA screenings—such screenings are 
required of “every air passenger” and are “minimally 
intrusive,” “public,” and “well-tailored to protect personal 
privacy.”  436 F.3d at 180.  These screenings, we emphasized, 
“escalat[e] in invasiveness only after a lower level of screening 
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disclose[s] a reason to conduct a more probing search,” so that 
even screenings that escalate to a pat-down may be properly 
categorized by their character at the outset as a “single search 
under the administrative search doctrine.”  Id. at 178, 180.  In 
view of this precedent, categorizing passenger screenings up to 
and including pat-downs as routine administrative searches, 
the dissent’s logic could not be cabined to TSA screeners, but 
instead would extend inexorably to all federal employees who 
perform administrative searches.30 
 In sum, as the delineated duties of TSOs make clear, and 
as is the case with many federal agencies, there is a clear 
division between the criminal law enforcement and non-
criminal law enforcement arms of the TSA.  TSOs—like meat 
inspectors, OSHA workers, and other personnel who are 
permitted to perform only administrative searches—fall into 
the latter category and thus do not qualify as “investigative or 
law enforcement officers” under the law enforcement proviso 
of the FTCA.  Because the proviso does not apply, Pellegrino’s 
intentional tort claims are barred by § 2680(h)’s intentional tort 
                                              
30 Even the dissent seems to acknowledge as much when 
it posits that “‘search’ in § 2680(h) is synonymous with the 
term ‘search’ as used in the Fourth Amendment,” Dissent at 
16, and derives from general dictionary definitions that “any 
officer of the United States” must mean anyone “charged with 
administering and maintaining the law” or “appointed or 
elected to serve in a position of trust, authority, or command,” 
Dissent at 25–26 (quoting Officer, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1971)). 
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exception, and the District Court correctly dismissed those 
claims based on the United States’ sovereign immunity.31 
* * * 
 We recognize that our holding here, combined with our 
decision in Vanderklok, means that individuals harmed by the 
intentional torts of TSOs will have very limited legal redress.32  
                                              
31 Typically, we construe a waiver of sovereign 
immunity strictly and “in favor of the sovereign.”  Lightfoot v. 
United States, 564 F.3d 625, 628 (3d Cir. 2009).  We are 
mindful that the Supreme Court has directed courts not to apply 
this general rule in interpreting exceptions to the waiver of 
immunity.  See, e.g., Dolan, 546 U.S. at 492.  Here, however, 
we are dealing with an exception to an exception, which 
arguably supports reverting to the general rule of strict 
construction.  See Foster v. United States, 522 F.3d 1071, 1079 
(9th Cir. 2008) (applying this analysis).  To the extent Dolan 
does apply to an exception to an exception, it directs us “to 
identify ‘those circumstances which are within the words and 
reason of the exception’—no less and no more.”  546 U.S. at 
492 (quoting Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n.9 
(1984)).  It does not, as the dissent asserts, suggest that the 
language should be interpreted against the Government.  In any 
event, we need not and do not here decide whether to construe 
the language in favor of the Government; we merely flag this 
issue as a reminder of the significant interests involved when 
the federal treasury is at stake. 
32 Counsel for the Government asserted at oral argument 
that the United States could, in appropriate cases, refuse to 
insulate a TSO from liability by declining to certify under the 
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And we are sympathetic to the concerns this may raise as a 
matter of policy, particularly given the nature and frequency of 
TSOs’ contact with the flying public.  For most people, TSA 
screenings are an unavoidable feature of flying, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44901(a), and they may involve thorough searches of not 
only the belongings of passengers but also their physical 
persons—searches that are even more rigorous and intimate for 
individuals who happen to be selected for physical pat-downs 
after passing through a metal detector or imaging scanner.  For 
these reasons, Congress may well see fit to expand the proviso 
or otherwise legislate recourse for passengers who seek to 
assert intentional tort claims against TSOs.  But such policy 
judgments, particularly as they relate to sovereign immunity 
and the public fisc, fall squarely in the realm of the legislative 
branch.  Because Congress to date has limited the proviso to 
“investigative or law enforcement officers” and TSOs do not 
meet that definition, we will affirm the dismissal of 
Pellegrino’s FTCA claims. 
V. Analysis of Other Claims 
 We will also affirm the District Court’s judgment as to 
Pellegrino’s remaining claims.  As for her other FTCA claims, 
“[t]he Federal Tort Claims Act [] bars actions against the 
United States for . . . defamation,” Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 
F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 2000), and Pennsylvania law forecloses 
the rest, see Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992) 
(“[T]he extent of the United States’ liability under the FTCA 
                                              
Westfall Act that the TSO was acting within the scope of her 
employment.  See Corrected Tr. of Oral Arg. at 30:6–12; see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1), (2); Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 
225, 229–30 (2007). 
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is generally determined by reference to state law.”).  That is 
because, under Pennsylvania law, “recovery for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress [has been] reserved 
by the courts for only the most clearly desperate and ultra 
extreme conduct,” Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 
1998), and a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
is restricted to four scenarios, see Toney v. Chester Cty. Hosp., 
961 A.2d 192, 197–98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008), none of which is 
present here.33 
 Nor did the District Court err in rejecting Pellegrino’s 
Bivens claims of retaliatory prosecution under the First 
Amendment and malicious prosecution under the Fourth 
Amendment.34  Vanderklok itself forecloses the retaliatory 
prosecution claim, see 868 F.3d at 209, and the same “special 
factors” that we observed there counseled against implying a 
Bivens claim—that TSA screeners are part of the national-
                                              
33 These factual scenarios are as follows: “(1) situations 
where the defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty toward 
the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to a physical 
impact; (3) the plaintiff was in a zone of danger, thereby 
reasonably experiencing a fear of impending physical injury; 
or (4) the plaintiff observed a tortious injury to a close 
relative.”  Toney, 961 A.2d at 197–98. 
34 We do not address the second issue that we asked 
Amicus to brief—whether the FTCA’s judgment bar precludes 
these Bivens claims—because the parties agree that it has since 
been resolved by the Supreme Court, which has ruled that the 
bar does not apply in these circumstances.  See Simmons v. 
Himmelreich, 136 S. Ct. 1843, 1847–48 (2016). 
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security system and protect the public safety, Congress should 
be the body to recognize new causes of action, and TSA 
screeners are not trained on the issues of probable cause that 
serve as the foundation of a retaliatory prosecution claim, id. at 
206–09—apply with equal force to Pellegrino’s claim of 
malicious prosecution, see, e.g., McKenna v. City of 
Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that 
a malicious prosecution claim requires showing that 
prosecution was initiated without probable cause).35 
 Pellegrino’s FOIA claims also fail.  In response to 
Pellegrino’s FOIA request,36 the TSA identified 375 pages of 
responsive documents, and withheld 90 of them, primarily on 
the ground that they were privileged and thus subject to 
Exemption 5 of FOIA.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5); Dep’t of 
Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 
8 (2001).  We perceive no error in the District Court’s 
conclusion that the TSA conducted an adequate search and that 
                                              
35 This also disposes of Pellegrino’s Bivens conspiracy 
and aiding-and-abetting claims.  See Black v. Montgomery 
County, 835 F.3d 358, 372 n.14 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Because the 
District Court reasoned that [the appellant] could not succeed 
on her underlying Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution 
or Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, it correctly 
determined that she could not succeed on her conspiracy 
claims.”).   
36 Pellegrino requested copies of “all records, reports, 
follow-up requests, etc., from any TSA office containing her 
name, Nadine Pellegrino Waldman[,] that was initiated by any 
TSA officer, official, investigator, or personnel.”  Gary Decl. 
¶ 4, D.Ct. Dkt. No. 232; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). 
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the documents it withheld were indeed exempt from 
production.  The TSA’s declaration attested to extensive 
searches, confirmed by the production of hundreds of 
responsive documents.  And the District Court conducted an in 
camera review of the documents withheld and made its own 
finding that they fell within FOIA’s exemption.  Pellegrino has 
identified no basis to disturb those rulings.   
 We are also unpersuaded that the District Court abused 
its discretion with respect to any of the case management 
orders challenged by Pellegrino.  It was under no obligation to 
give Pellegrino an additional extension of time to file still more 
material when it had already granted her an extension of time 
to file her motion for reconsideration and response to the 
Government’s motion for reconsideration, and Pellegrino had 
then filed a motion spanning hundreds of pages.  Nor did it err 
in denying Pellegrino leave to amend her complaint yet again 
when the case had been ongoing for two years and Pellegrino 
had already amended three times.  See generally Airborne 
Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 
666–67 (7th Cir. 2007).   
As for the sealing orders, the documents subject to the 
first sealing order were filed under seal as Pellegrino requested, 
and the Court reasonably refused to issue a second sealing 
order to permit Pellegrino to file previously available evidence 
in support of her motion for reconsideration.  See, e.g., Max’s 
Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
677 (3d Cir. 1999).  And while Pellegrino argues that she 
needed to depose additional witnesses who were not made 
available to her, she has not established that this limitation 
prejudiced her in any way.  See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. 
Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that a 
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discovery order will not be disturbed “absent a showing of 
actual and substantial prejudice”).37   
In sum, the District Court dedicated an enormous 
amount of time and care to this case and its rulings were well 
within the broad scope of its discretion. 
VI. Conclusion  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
                                              
37 To the extent that Pellegrino challenges the District 
Court’s disposition of her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 
the APA, or the Privacy Act, we have reviewed the District 
Court’s analysis and discern no error. 
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Nadine Pellegrino, et al. v. TSA, et al. 
No.  15-3047 
_________________________________________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
 The Federal Government is typically immune from 
suit.  The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 
waives the Government’s immunity for certain torts 
committed by Government employees.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) 
does so for specific intentional torts committed by 
“investigative or law enforcement officers,” which it defines 
as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law 
to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for 
violations of Federal law.”   
 Nadine Pellegrino relies on § 2680(h) to recover 
against Transportation Security Officers (“TSOs”) who, she 
alleges, detained her, damaged her property, and fabricated 
charges against her.  Pellegrino contends TSOs fit fully 
within its purview because they are legally empowered to 
conduct searches of all passengers and property before 
boarding commercial flights originating in the United States.  
Consequently, she argues her intentional-tort claims should 
proceed to trial.   
Although there is scant textual basis for denying 
Pellegrino’s claims, my colleagues hold that TSOs are 
immune from suit because they deem § 2680(h)’s waiver of 
immunity to include only criminal law enforcement officers.  
They equate airport screenings with routine administrative 
inspections, even though the former involve rigorous and 
thorough searches that often extend to an individual’s 
physical person.  Their opinion leaves several plaintiffs 
without a remedy, even if a TSO assaults them, wrongfully 
detains them, or fabricates criminal charges against them.  I 
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do not believe this is what Congress intended when it drafted 
§ 2680(h) or pertinent Transportation Security Administration 
(“TSA”) statutes.   
 While I agree with my colleagues’ reasoning on other 
points, I do not agree that § 2680(h) solely refers to criminal 
law enforcement officers.  Instead, it applies to “any officer” 
who has legal authority to “execute searches . . . for violations 
of Federal law.”  TSOs may by law execute searches, as they 
must screen “all passengers and property, including United 
States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other 
articles, that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft 
operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air 
transportation or intrastate air transportation.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 44901(a).  The statute and its implementing regulations 
further define screening to include “a physical search 
together with manifest verification,” id. § 44901(g)(5) 
(emphasis added), and “the inspection of individuals, 
accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo,” 49 C.F.R. 
§ 1546.207(a).  Hence TSOs are covered by § 2680(h)’s 
definition of investigative or law enforcement officer based 
on its explicit language. 
 Even if we assume the definition is ambiguous, the 
result is the same.  TSOs are liable under § 2680(h) because 
the Supreme Court has instructed us to interpret the Federal 
Tort Claims Act broadly in favor of waiving the 
Government’s immunity against suit.  See Dolan v. U.S. 
Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 491-92 (2006).  Thus I would 
reverse the District Court’s ruling as to § 2680(h) and allow 
Pellegrino’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution claims to proceed to trial.  
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I. Background Matters 
A. Factual Background  
 For ease of reference, I restate the facts as I understand 
them.  On July 29, 2006, Pellegrino and her husband Harry 
Waldman arrived at the Philadelphia International Airport to 
board a flight home to Florida.  After she passed through the 
security checkpoint, Pellegrino was randomly selected for 
additional screening.  TSO Thomas Clemmons began 
examining her bags, but she stopped him, demanding a 
private screening.   
TSA employees subsequently led her to a private 
screening room, where TSOs Nuyriah Abdul-Malik, Laura 
Labbee, and Denise Kissinger conducted the screening.  
Kissinger swabbed the front and back of Pellegrino’s shirt, 
and Abdul-Malik screened her luggage.  According to 
Pellegrino, Abdul-Malik’s inspection was unduly rough 
because she allegedly counted Pellegrino’s coins and 
currency, rifled through her papers, examined her cell phone 
data, read the front and back of her membership and credit 
cards, and opened and smelled her cosmetics, mints, and hand 
sanitizer.  She claims Abdul-Malik did not close the lids to 
various containers the latter opened, causing the previously 
enclosed items to spill inside her bags and damage her 
property.  Pellegrino further contends Abdul-Malik punched, 
jammed, and forced her belongings back into her luggage, 
damaging it, her jewelry, and her eyeglasses in the process. 
At that point in the search, Pellegrino informed 
Labbee, the supervisor at the checkpoint, that she intended to 
report the TSOs’ conduct to TSA superiors.  After Abdul-
Malik had forcibly closed her luggage, Pellegrino also 
demanded to know “what is going on here[;] both of you are 
behaving like bitches.”  In response to Pellegrino’s 
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comments, Abdul-Malik asked Labbee to call the police, but 
the TSOs did not summon law enforcement to arrest 
Pellegrino at that time.  Instead, they continued searching her 
luggage.  Kissinger swabbed various shoes and clothing in 
Pellegrino’s bag, and Abdul-Malik searched the contents of 
the bag.  After they finished, Kissinger and Abdul-Malik told 
Pellegrino that the search was over and that she could leave 
the private screening room.  She proceeded to move her 
belongings to a search table outside of the private screening 
room.  She first tossed her shoes from the doorway of the 
screening room onto the floor of the security checkpoint area 
after checking that no one else was in her surroundings.  She 
also made multiple trips from the private screening room to 
the search table because she had three pieces of luggage.  On 
her first trip, she carried her largest bag out of the private 
screening room.  Labbee contends Pellegrino struck her in the 
stomach with the bottom of the bag as she was moving the 
bag to the search table.  When Pellegrino returned to retrieve 
a smaller bag, Abdul-Malik allegedly blocked her access to it, 
forcing her to crawl under a table to retrieve the bag.  When 
Pellegrino did so, it tipped over, striking the ground with a 
loud noise.  Abdul-Malik claims Pellegrino struck her in the 
leg while she was collecting the bag.  She denies striking 
either Abdul-Malik or Labbee with her luggage and alleges 
she heard both TSOs say to each other, “You saw her hit me, 
didn’t you?” 
After Pellegrino had retrieved her luggage, Labbee and 
Abdul-Malik walked to the supervisor’s station to press 
charges against her and to summon local police.  Labbee 
directed Pellegrino to stay at the security checkpoint until the 
police arrived.  Although Pellegrino requested that the TSA 
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official in charge of the airport be called to the checkpoint, 
her request went unheeded.1 
When the police arrived, Pellegrino was frisked, 
handcuffed, and arrested.  Labbee confiscated her driver’s 
license and, along with Abdul-Malik, swore out criminal 
complaints against her.  Kissinger offered a witness statement 
corroborating the allegation that Pellegrino struck Labbee in 
the leg with her bag.  The police escorted Pellegrino out of 
the airport in plain view of other passengers.  She was held 
for roughly 18 hours and released after her husband posted 
approximately $400 in bail.  
The police incident report stated Pellegrino struck both 
Labbee and Abdul-Malik with her bags and shoes that she 
tossed out of the private screening room.  It also noted both 
TSOs suffered from leg pain and a stomach bruise as a result 
of Pellegrino’s actions.   
Did things calm down?  Hardly.  The Philadelphia 
District Attorney’s Office charged Pellegrino with ten 
criminal violations: two counts of felony aggravated assault, 
see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702; two counts of possession of an 
instrument of a crime (the suitcases allegedly used to hit the 
TSOs), see id. § 907; two counts of making terroristic threats, 
see id. § 2706; two counts of simple assault, see id. § 2701; 
and two counts of recklessly endangering another person, see 
id. § 2705.  (Someone must have taken creative charging and 
aced the test; either that or there was a lot of lawyer-lounge 
temporizing.) 
                                              
1 While the relevant TSA official was notified that 
Pellegrino wished to speak with him, neither he nor his 
representative arrived at the checkpoint to speak with 
Pellegrino or her husband.  
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 On October 25, 2006, Pellegrino attended a 
preliminary hearing in her criminal case.  The presiding judge 
dismissed several charges, and the District Attorney 
abandoned other charges, with the exception of two counts of 
simple assault and two counts of possession of an instrument 
of a crime (the suitcases allegedly used to hit the TSOs).  
Those remaining charges proceeded to trial on March 28, 
2008, in Philadelphia Municipal Court.  The judge entered not 
guilty verdicts as to each charge based on insufficiency of the 
evidence put in by the TSA: it failed to produce video 
surveillance recordings of the incident;2 Abdul-Malik failed 
to appear in court; and Labbee’s testimony was internally 
inconsistent and contradictory on key points.  
B. Procedural Background 
After criminal proceedings concluded, Pellegrino 
submitted a claim to the TSA describing the TSOs’ conduct 
during and following the July 29th incident at the airport.  
The TSA denied the claim, and Pellegrino turned to federal 
court for relief.  She alleged numerous constitutional and 
statutory violations against the TSA, Abdul-Malik, Labbee, 
Kissinger, and other unnamed TSOs.  The District Court 
dismissed most of her claims except for property damage, 
                                              
2 On August 14, 2006, Pellegrino received a letter from 
the TSA indicating it was considering imposing a civil 
penalty for her actions during the July 29th incident at the 
airport.  The TSA’s letter also stated it had begun a Civil 
Action Enforcement investigation of the incident.  
Pellegrino’s attorney wrote to and spoke with the TSA to 
defer the investigation and to preserve any relevant 
surveillance footage.  It, however, maintained that no video 
cameras had captured the incident and thus no recordings 
existed for evidentiary purposes. 
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false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and her Bivens claims for 
malicious prosecution under the First and Fourth 
Amendments.  During summary judgment, the Court ruled in 
favor of the TSA on all of her remaining claims except for the 
property damage claim, which the parties later settled. 
Although Pellegrino appeals the District Court’s 
rulings on all of her claims, I focus on those for false arrest, 
false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act.  The Court held it lacked 
jurisdiction over those claims because they do not fall within 
§ 2680(h)’s proviso, which waives sovereign immunity for 
certain intentional torts committed by investigative or law 
enforcement officers.  Although the proviso defines 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” as “any officer of 
the United States who is empowered by law to execute 
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations 
of Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), the District Court stated 
the phrase “searches . . . for violations of Federal law” was 
“ambiguous,” Pellegrino v. Transp. Sec. Admin., No. 09-
5505, 2014 WL 1489939, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2014).   
Because “[t]he relevant statutory scheme shed[] little 
light on how broadly ‘search’ is to be defined,” the Court 
turned to legislative history.  Id. at *6.  In its view, 
§ 2680(h)’s legislative history “strongly suggests that the . . . 
proviso was enacted as a response to specific eg[]regious 
behavior during raids conducted by federal law enforcement 
officers . . . and was not intended to be expansive enough to 
cover airport security screeners.”  Id. at *7.  As such, it 
denied relief to Pellegrino on her false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims.  She 
appeals, challenging, among other things, the District Court’s 
determination that it lacked jurisdiction over her claims.   
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C. Statutory Background 
As noted, the Federal Tort Claims Act waives 
sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by federal 
employees.  “[Its] provisions are contained in two areas of the 
United States Code.”  Simmons v. Himmelreich, 136 S. Ct. 
1843, 1846 (2016).  The first, “28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), gives 
federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims 
against the United States for the acts of its employees 
‘[s]ubject to the provisions of chapter 171’ of Title 28.”  Id. 
(footnote omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).  “Chapter 
171, in turn, . . . comprises the remaining provisions of the 
[Act],” including § 2680, which contains exceptions to the 
Act’s broad waiver of immunity.  Id. 
Of all the exceptions listed in § 2680, subsection h is 
most pertinent to this appeal.  In full it states:    
The provisions of . . . section 1346(b) [that is, 
the waiver of immunity] of this title shall not 
apply to — . . . 
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with 
contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to 
acts or omissions of investigative or law 
enforcement officers of the United States 
Government, the provisions of this chapter 
and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to 
any claim arising, on or after the date of the 
enactment of this proviso, out of assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse 
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of process, or malicious prosecution.  For the 
purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” means any officer of the 
United States who is empowered by law to 
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make 
arrests for violations of Federal law. 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  The first part of § 2680(h) extends 
sovereign immunity for any claim traced to “assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse 
of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights.”  Id.  As noted, it is an 
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the 
Government has the burden of proving it applies.  See S.R.P. 
ex rel. Abunabba v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 333 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (stating exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act 
are “analogous to . . . affirmative defense[s]”); see also Bunch 
v. United States, 880 F.3d 938, 941 (7th Cir. 2018) (Wood, 
C.J.) (“The burden . . . shift[s] to the [G]overnment to support 
its affirmative defense that the exception . . . for intentional 
torts applies and is not vitiated by the . . . proviso.”).  
The second part of § 2680(h) is a “proviso” and an 
exception to the exception, as it reasserts the Federal Tort 
Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity when certain 
intentional torts are committed by “investigative or law 
enforcement officers.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  Importantly, it 
also contains its own definition of “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” that we “must follow . . . even if it 
varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”  Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000). 
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II. TSOs are investigative or law enforcement officers 
under § 2680(h). 
 Relying on § 2680(h)’s text, Pellegrino argues TSOs 
are “investigative or law enforcement officers” because they 
are legally empowered to execute searches for violations of 
federal law.  The Government responds that the proviso 
encompasses only those who exercise traditional law 
enforcement functions.  Asserting that “Congress . . . did not 
empower [TSOs] with law enforcement authority,” the 
Government contends TSOs do not fall within its carve-out 
from immunity.  Gov’t Suppl. Br. at 11. 
 Neither side disputes that TSOs conduct administrative 
searches.  See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“[The appellant’s] search at the airport 
checkpoint was justified by the administrative search 
doctrine.”).  Indeed, Pellegrino uses this point to argue that 
TSA screenings are “searches . . . for violations of Federal 
law” under § 2680(h).  In view of this argument, my 
colleagues characterize her position as extending to all 
administrative searches.  According to them, her reading 
“would sweep into [§ 2680(h)’s] ambit large swaths of the 
federal workforce, producing an unprecedented expansion of 
the United States’ tort liability.”  Majority Op. at 27. 
But Pellegrino’s position is not that far-reaching.  See 
Corrected Tr. of Oral Arg. at 9:1–2 (amicus counsel on behalf 
of Pellegrino stating we need not address whether certain 
regulatory searches fall within § 2680(h)’s proviso because 
those cases “are not before [us] today” (internal punctuation 
altered)), 10:13–14 (amicus counsel stating the issue of other 
regulatory searches is not “before [us] right now”).  Instead of 
directing her arguments to all administrative searches, 
Pellegrino asks us to resolve whether TSOs are investigative 
or law enforcement officers under § 2680(h).  She notes that 
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TSA screenings are more expansive than traditional 
administrative inspections, as they extend to the general 
public and often involve searches of an individual’s physical 
person.  See Suppl. Reply Br. at 13-14.  In light of these 
differences, she claims TSA screenings fall within the ambit 
of § 2680(h).     
I agree that TSA screenings are searches under 
§ 2680(h) and that TSOs are “investigative or law 
enforcement officers” as defined by the proviso.  The plain 
text of the statutory scheme supports this outcome.  And even 
if there were ambiguity here, we must construe it in 
Pellegrino’s favor.  Thus her false arrest, false imprisonment, 
and malicious prosecution claims should survive summary 
judgment and proceed to trial. 
A. TSOs execute searches for violations of  
  federal law.  
As noted, TSOs may qualify as investigative or law 
enforcement officers if they “execute searches . . . for 
violations of Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  To 
determine whether TSOs execute searches, I begin with the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (the 
“Transportation Security Act”).  In pertinent part, it requires 
TSOs to screen “all passengers and property, 
including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked 
baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a 
passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air 
carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation.”  
49 U.S.C. § 44901(a).  It defines screening in one context as 
“a physical search together with manifest verification,” id. 
§ 44901(g)(5) (emphasis added), and in other contexts as 
“[an] inspection of individuals, accessible property, checked 
baggage, and cargo,” 49 C.F.R. § 1546.207(a); see also 
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Bunch, 880 F.3d at 943 (stating inspections are searches 
under the proviso).   
TSA screenings no doubt are “permissible under the 
administrative search doctrine.”  Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 181; 
see also George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 577 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“It is not disputed that the initial airport screening to which 
[the Appellant] was subjected by the TSA Officials was a 
constitutionally permissible administrative search under the 
Fourth Amendment, even though it was initiated without 
individualized suspicion and was conducted without a 
warrant.”).  Thus, if the term “search” in § 2680(h) is 
synonymous with the term “search” as used in interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment, the inquiry likely ends here.   
The Government does not dispute this point.  Instead, 
it contends TSA screenings are not searches under 
§ 2680(h)’s proviso because they are consensual and limited 
in nature.  It also asserts the definition of “search” under 
§ 2680(h) is narrower than the meaning of the word “search” 
under the Fourth Amendment.  
Although we have not squarely decided this issue, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that airport screenings do not depend 
on a passenger’s consent.  See United States v. Aukai, 497 
F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).  We approvingly 
quoted the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in George v. Rehiel.  See 
738 F.3d at 575 (“The constitutionality of an airport screening 
search . . . does not depend on consent. . . .  [A]ll that is 
required is the passenger’s election to attempt entry into the 
secured area.  Under current TSA regulations and procedures, 
that election occurs when a prospective passenger walks 
through the magnetometer or places items on the conveyor 
belt of the x-ray machine.” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Aukai, 497 F.3d at 961)).  Moreover, the TSA’s 
regulations suggest TSO screenings are not consensual; any 
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individual who does not consent to a screening may not board 
a flight.  See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107(a) (“No individual may 
enter a sterile area or board an aircraft without submitting to 
the screening and inspection of his or her person and 
accessible property in accordance with the procedures being 
applied to control access to that area or aircraft under this 
subchapter.”); id. § 1544.201(c)(1) (“Each aircraft 
operator . . . must refuse to transport - (1) [a]ny individual 
who does not consent to a search or inspection of his or her 
person. . . .”).  Under a reasonable reading of our case law 
and the pertinent regulations, TSA screenings are not 
consensual searches.  It follows that “consent” is not an 
adequate basis for concluding TSA screenings fall outside the 
proviso in § 2680(h). 
Similarly, the limited nature of TSA screenings does 
not put them outside the ambit of the proviso.  To start, its 
plain language does not require searches to be limited or 
broad in nature.  Its words also do not require searches to be 
directed to all violations of federal law or to traditional law 
enforcement functions.  They simply require investigative or 
law enforcement officers to “execute searches . . . for 
violations of federal law.”  TSO screenings are searches for 
violations of federal law because they are directed to illegal 
and prohibited items on passenger aircraft.  See, e.g., 49 
U.S.C. § 46505 (providing criminal penalties for “[c]arrying a 
weapon or explosive on an aircraft”); 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 172.101, 175.10(a) (listing “hazardous materials” that are 
not permitted on flights).3  Hence the limited nature of TSA’s 
                                              
3 My colleagues claim that “most of the prohibited 
items for which TSOs search are perfectly legal to possess in 
other contexts” and assert that TSOs may only assess civil 
penalties for screening violations.  Majority Op. at 45 & n.29.  
In my view, these distinctions are not enough to exclude 
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screenings is not sufficient to exclude them from the scope of 
§ 2680(h)’s carve-out from immunity. 
Finally, while the proviso provides no definition for 
the term “search,” the lack of statutory guidance does not 
weigh in the Government’s favor.  In Terry v. Ohio, the 
Supreme Court stated that a search includes “a careful 
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all 
over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons.”  392 U.S. 
1, 16 (1968).  Congress likely knew and adopted this 
definition of search in enacting § 2680(h) because “it is a 
cardinal rule of statutory construction that, when Congress 
employs a term of art,  it presumably knows and adopts the 
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in 
                                                                                                     
TSOs from the proviso’s reach, as many other law 
enforcement officers search for items that are “perfectly legal 
to possess in other contexts” and also impose civil penalties 
for screening violations.  See, e.g., Bringing Agricultural 
Products into the United States, U.S. Customs & Border 
Prot., https://www.cbp.gov/travel/clearing-cbp/bringing-
agricultural-products-united-states (last visited July 9, 2018) 
(stating Customs and Border Protection agricultural 
specialists may assess civil penalties if a traveler brings 
certain agricultural products without appropriate “permits”); 
see also CBP Careers in Focus: Agricultural Specialists – 
Protecting American Agriculture, U.S. Customs & Border 
Prot., https://www.cbp.gov/careers/join-cbp/which-cbp-
career/agriculture-specialist-focus (last visited July 9, 2018) 
(noting agricultural specialists “work[] in a . . . law[-
]enforcement environment”).  
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the body of learning from which it was taken. . . .”4  F.A.A. v. 
Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 
(1992) (stating “[t]his rule carries particular force in 
interpreting the [Federal Tort Claims Act].”).  Terry’s 
definition of “search” is also consistent with the TSA’s own 
description of pat-down searches: “inspection[s] of the head, 
neck, arms, torso, legs, and feet . . . [,] includ[ing] head 
coverings and sensitive areas such as breasts, groin, and the 
buttocks.”5  Security Screening, Transp. Sec. Admin., 
                                              
4 The Supreme Court decided Terry six years before 
Congress enacted § 2680(h).  Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968), with Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
253, 88 Stat. 50.   
 
5 Even though pat-down searches are conducted 
analogously to Terry stops, the majority states they are not 
comparable because the latter “require reasonable, articulable 
suspicion.”  Majority Op. at 46.  This misapprehends the 
TSA’s screening procedures, which (in some instances) allow 
for pat-down searches if “a lower level of screening 
disclose[s] a reason to conduct a more probing search.”  
Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180; see also Bob Burns, TSA 
Mythbuster: The Rest of the DFW Pat-Down Story, Transp. 
Sec. Admin. (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/03/28/tsa-mythbuster-rest-
dfw-pat-down-story (noting pat-down searches may be 
conducted “if the screening technology alarms”).   
 
The majority also claims we previously concluded that 
“screenings that escalate to a pat-down may be properly 
categorized . . . as a ‘single search under the administrative 
search doctrine.’”  Majority Op. at 47 (quoting Hartwell, 436 
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https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening (last visited 
July 9, 2018).  Thus “search” in § 2680(h) is synonymous 
with the term “search” as used in the Fourth Amendment, and 
TSA screenings are searches under § 2680(h). 
B. TSOs are empowered to conduct searches for 
violations of federal law.  
To repeat, § 2680(h) requires that an investigative or 
law enforcement officer be “empowered by law to execute 
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations 
of Federal law.”  The Government argues that “Congress did 
not grant [TSOs] . . . any independent authority to conduct a 
search, seizure, or arrest.”  Gov’t Suppl. Br. at 9.  As such, it 
contends TSOs lack any legal authority to conduct airport 
screenings.  
That contention is incorrect because the Transportation 
Security Act empowers TSOs to conduct screenings for 
“flights and flight segments originating in the United States.”  
See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a).  It defines “screening” to include 
both “a physical search together with manifest verification,” 
id. § 44901(g)(5) (emphasis added), and “[an] inspection of 
individuals, accessible property, checked baggage, 
and cargo,” 49 C.F.R. § 1546.207(a).  Thus, per the explicit 
language of the statute, TSOs are empowered by law to 
                                                                                                     
F.3d at 178).  Our precedent, however, did not reach that 
holding.  See Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 178 (“We will 
employ [the Fifth Circuit’s] method of analyzing Hartwell’s 
entire experience as a single search under the administrative 
search doctrine, and—finding this approach sufficient to 
resolve the case—do not pass judgment on the [Second 
Circuit’s] approach.”).  
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perform searches.  See Bunch, 880 F.3d at 943 (stating 
inspections may be searches under the proviso).   
C. TSOs are officers of the United States. 
Finally, § 2680(h) requires TSOs to be “officers of the 
United States.”  Although it does not define the term 
“officer,” its neighboring provisions differentiate between 
“officers” and “employees.”  For instance, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 
defines “employee of the government” to include “officers or 
employees of any federal agency,” indicating that officers and 
non-officer employees are mutually exclusive.  Similarly, 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) bars certain individuals from “bring[ing] 
a civil action against the United States or an agency, officer, 
or employee of the Government.”   
The Transportation Security Act also distinguishes 
between officers and employees.  Although it classifies TSOs 
as “Federal Government employee[s],” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a), 
it incorporates the definition of employee in 5 U.S.C. § 2105, 
which states: 
For the purpose of this title, “employee[,]” . . . 
means an officer and an individual who is— 
(1) appointed in the civil service by one 
of the following acting in an official 
capacity— 
(A) the President; 
(B) a Member or Members of 
Congress, or the Congress; 
(C) a member of a uniformed 
service; 
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(D) an individual who is 
an employee under this section; 
(E) the head of a Government 
controlled corporation; or 
(F) an adjutant general designated 
by the Secretary. . . ; 
(2) engaged in the performance of a 
Federal function under authority of law 
or an Executive act; and 
(3) subject to the supervision of an 
individual named by paragraph (1) of 
this subsection while engaged in the 
performance of the duties of his position. 
5 U.S.C. § 2105 (emphasis added).  The term “officer” is 
further defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2104, which provides: 
For the purpose of this title, “officer[,]” . . . 
except as otherwise provided by this section or 
when specifically modified, means a justice or 
judge of the United States and an individual 
who is— 
(1) required by law to be appointed in the 
civil service by one of the following 
acting in an official capacity— 
(A) the President; 
(B) a court of the United States; 
(C) the head of an Executive 
agency; or 
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(D) the Secretary of a military 
department; 
(2) engaged in the performance of a 
Federal function under authority of law 
or an Executive act; and 
(3) subject to the supervision of an 
authority named by paragraph (1) of this 
section, or the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, while engaged in the 
performance of the duties of his office. 
Id. § 2104 (emphasis added).6  “Executive agency,” defined 
in 5 U.S.C. § 105, “means an Executive department, 
a Government corporation, and an independent 
establishment.”  Finally, for purposes of Title 5, an 
“independent establishment” is defined as “(1) an 
establishment in the executive branch (other than the United 
States Postal Service or the Postal Regulatory Commission) 
which is not an Executive department, military 
department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part 
                                              
6 TSOs are not officers under 5 U.S.C. § 2104’s 
conjunctive test because they are not appointed by the head of 
an Executive agency.  See 5 U.S.C. § 105 (noting an 
“Executive agency” includes “an Executive department, 
a Government corporation, and an independent 
establishment”); 49 U.S.C. § 44935 note (stating TSOs are 
appointed by the Under Secretary of Transportation for 
Security).  More importantly, Title 5 is not an appropriate 
guide in this context, as it excludes several federal agents who 
are unquestionably “investigative or law enforcement 
officers” under § 2680(h).  See infra pp. 20-21.    
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of an independent establishment; and (2) the Government 
Accountability Office.”  Id. § 104. 
At oral argument, both sides agreed that § 2104’s 
definition of officer is underinclusive in this context, see 
Corrected Tr. of Oral Arg. at 14:4–12, 38:3–4, and amicus 
counsel cited postal inspectors as support for this point, see 
id. at 14:4–12.  Under a rigid reading of the text, postal 
inspectors would not fall within § 2680(h)’s proviso, and yet 
we know they are not excluded.  See Banks v. Merit Sys. Prot. 
Bd., 854 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“5 U.S.C. § 104 
provides that the Postal Service is not an ‘independent 
establishment’—and therefore not an ‘Executive agency’—
for the purpose of Title 5.” (emphasis in original)); Moore v. 
United States, 213 F.3d 705, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating 
postal inspectors are “investigative or law enforcement 
officers” under § 2680(h)).  Similarly, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS” and now known as 
“Immigration and Customs Enforcement” or “ICE”) agents 
are included in § 2680(h)’s proviso even though the INS is 
not an executive agency under 5 U.S.C. § 105.  See Amend v. 
Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 221 F. App’x 983, 983-84 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (per curiam) (noting the INS “was part of the 
Department of Justice” before “INS was abolished . . . and its 
functions transferred to the Department of Homeland 
Security”); Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1234 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (“By its terms, [§ 2680(h)] waives the 
government’s immunity to liability arising out of certain 
intentional torts committed by investigative and law 
enforcement officers such as the INS agents.”).  Thus 5 
U.S.C. § 2104 cannot be a guidepost for interpreting 
§ 2680(h), as it would lead to incongruous results.  
Our sister Circuits have taken a similar approach, 
holding that both Veterans Administration security guards 
and INS agents are covered by § 2680(h)’s proviso even 
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though they are statutorily classified as employees.  Compare 
Celestine v. United States, 841 F.2d 851, 852 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(per curiam) (holding “VA hospital security guards are VA 
police officers” and thus fall within the scope of § 2680(h)), 
with 38 U.S.C. § 902(a) (designating VA police officers as 
employees); compare Caban, 671 F.2d at 1234 (“By its 
terms, [§ 2680(h)] waives the government’s immunity to 
liability arising out of certain intentional torts committed by 
investigative and law enforcement officers such as the INS 
agents.”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (stating agents may be 
“officer[s] or employee[s]”).  This suggests that a federal 
agent’s job responsibilities seem to be more outcome 
determinative than the agent’s employment status.  Indeed, if 
employment status were decisive in this context, Congress 
could easily insulate federal agents from intentional tort 
claims by designating them as employees, frustrating the 
reach of § 2680(h).  See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 
U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions. . . .”). 
My colleagues do not agree.  They contend that 
interpreting the proviso to “cover[] only criminal law 
enforcement officers” maintains the distinction between 
“officers” and “employees” in other provisions of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act.  Majority Op. at 19; see also id. at 20 n.11.  
But that approach “would render a significant part of 
[§ 2680(h)] a nullity,” as there would be no need to define the 
functions of an “investigative or law enforcement officer” if 
the provision only referred to “criminal law enforcement 
officers.”  Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. 
Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 448 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 
2006) (Sotomayor, J.).  It would also “violate[] the settled 
rule that a statute must . . . be construed in such fashion that 
every word has some operative effect.”  United States v. 
Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992); see also United 
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States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 199 (3d Cir. 1980) (“We 
should not construe a statute to make it redundant of 
itself. . . .”).  Thus the majority’s reading does not “hew more 
closely” to Congress’s definition of “investigative or law 
enforcement officer.”  Majority Op. at 40 n.26.  Instead, it 
“transform[s] [it] into surplusage,” reading it out of the 
proviso.  United States v. Kouevi, 698 F.3d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 
2012).   
We encounter the same problem if we read 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” as “a[ny] person 
who is designated an ‘officer’ and who performs traditional 
criminal law enforcement functions.”  Majority Op. at 20 n.11 
(suggesting this interpretation in light of the anti-redundancy 
canon).  This is because Congress listed “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” in the disjunctive, giving both terms 
“separate meanings.”  Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 
330, 339 (1979) (“Canons of construction ordinarily suggest 
that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate 
meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise. . . .”).  The 
majority’s approach, however, blurs the distinction between 
each term, effectively deleting  “investigative officer” from 
the proviso’s text and “rob[bing]” it “of [any] independent 
and ordinary significance.”7  Id. at 338-39.   
                                              
7 My colleagues state “it is not unusual for Congress to 
define ‘law enforcement officer’ by reference to the officer’s 
duties, even if those duties all sound in criminal law.”  
Majority Op. at 20 n.11.  But Congress did not solely define 
“law enforcement officer” in § 2680(h).  It also included the 
term “investigative officer.”  We fail to give that term any 
distinct meaning if we adopt the reading my colleagues 
advance, as it would excise “investigative officer” entirely 
from the proviso’s text.   
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It is worth noting that the Seventh Circuit refused to 
adopt the same reading in a recent case.  See Bunch, 880 F.3d 
at 943-45.  Instead of limiting the proviso’s reach to law 
enforcement officers, see Gov’t Br. at 22, Bunch v. United 
States, No. 16-3775 (7th Cir. May 3, 2017) (advancing this 
argument), the Court noted § 2680(h) covers “both 
investigative and law[]enforcement officers,” Bunch, 880 
F.3d at 944 (emphasis in original).  More importantly, it held 
a chemist in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(“ATF”) could fall within the proviso’s terms.  See id. at 943 
(“The materials presented . . . at the summary-judgment stage 
do not foreclose the possibility that the law empowered 
Kinard (and his fellow chemists) to execute searches or to 
seize evidence.”).  In reaching its holding, the Court assigned 
no significance to the types of inspections (i.e., searches) the 
chemist could perform.  See id. (stating 27 C.F.R. § 55.31 
(1995) authorizes ATF officers to “inspect the site of any 
accident or fire” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Nor did 
it distinguish between officers and employees.  See id. 
(acknowledging the regulations also defined an “ATF officer” 
as “[a]n officer or employee of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco[,] and Firearms (ATF) authorized to perform any 
function related to . . . administration or enforcement” (first 
alteration in original) (emphases added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Rather, it looked to the chemist’s job 
responsibilities, examining them vis-à-vis the proviso’s 
language.  See id.  The majority, by contrast, limits the 
proviso’s reach before undertaking this analysis.  This is at 
odds with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, and it leaves 
plaintiffs across the country without a consistent set of 
remedies.  
While the Supreme Court has not decided this issue, it 
has also been reluctant to constrict the proviso’s scope.  See 
Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 54, 57 (2013) 
(declining to read additional language into § 2680(h)’s 
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“unambiguous text” and overruling Pooler v. United States, 
787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986), and its progeny, including 
Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
Critically, it rejected an interpretation that would cabin the 
definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer.”  See 
id. at 56.  In the Court’s view, “[h]ad Congress intended 
to . . . narrow the scope of the proviso,” it would have 
included language to that effect.  Id. at 57; see also Campos v. 
United States, 888 F.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting 
Millbrook “refus[es] to allow limitations to be placed on 
the . . . proviso”).    
The same principle is apt here: if Congress intended 
§ 2680(h) to apply solely to criminal law enforcement 
officers, it would have “limited it to claims arising from ‘acts 
or omissions of [criminal] law enforcement officers’” and 
would not have included any additional definitional language.  
Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 57; see also Burgess v. United States, 
553 U.S. 124, 129 (2008) (“Statutory definitions control the 
meaning of statutory words . . . in the usual case.” (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stenberg, 530 
U.S. at 942 (“When a statute includes an explicit definition, 
we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that 
term’s ordinary meaning.”).  Thus, in light of its statutory 
definition and Supreme Court precedent, § 2680(h)’s 
references to “investigative officers” and “any officer of the 
United States” cannot solely encompass criminal law 
enforcement officers.   
My colleagues do not discuss much of this case law.  
Instead, they rely on non-text authorities to advance their 
reading of “officer.”  See infra Part III.A-B (addressing the 
majority’s arguments).  I do not follow their approach 
because it is our job to construe Congress’s language “in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning.”  United States v. 
Husmann, 765 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal 
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quotation marks omitted) (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. 
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014)).  
Here, if we look to dictionary definitions to determine 
Congress’s intent, they do not contain any reference to law 
enforcement personnel.  See Officer, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1971) (stating an officer is “one 
charged with administering and maintaining the law (as a 
constable, bailiff, sheriff)” or “one who holds an office; one 
who is appointed or elected to serve in a position of trust, 
authority, or command esp[ecially] as specif[ically] provided 
for by law”); Officer, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. rev. 
1968) (noting an officer is “[o]ne who is charged by a 
superior power (and particularly by government) with the 
power and duty of exercising certain functions.  One who is 
invested with some portion of the functions of the 
government to be exercised for the public benefit. . . .”).  This 
cuts against my colleagues’ interpretation, as it tells us the 
proviso’s reach is more expansive than their take.   
I am mindful that “a ‘word must not be read in 
isolation but instead [is] defined by reference to its statutory 
context.’”  Husmann, 765 F.3d at 173 (quoting Ali v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 234 (2008)).  But this too 
does not favor a restrictive reading of the proviso.  Instead, it 
marshals against the majority’s approach, as the term “any 
officer of the United States” must be read to “ha[ve] a wide 
reach.”  Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) 
(“The term ‘any’ ensures that the definition has a wide reach. 
. . .”); see also Ali, 552 U.S. at 220 (“Congress’[s] use of 
‘any’ to modify ‘other law enforcement officer’ [in § 2680(c)] 
is most naturally read to mean law enforcement officers of 
whatever kind.”).  Thus “any officer of the United States” 
includes (1) those “charged with administering and 
maintaining the law” and (2) those “who [are] appointed or 
elected to serve in a position of trust, authority, or command.”  
Officer, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
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(1971).  These definitions are consistent with the statutory 
scheme and comport with my earlier observation that an 
“agent’s job responsibilities seem to be . . . outcome 
determinative” under § 2680(h).  More importantly, they 
suggest that my colleagues’ reading is not consistent with the 
proviso’s plain meaning.8   
If we apply these definitions in this context, TSOs 
qualify as officers.  They are charged with administering and 
maintaining the law, and their searches are directed to illegal 
and prohibited items on passenger aircraft.  See 49 U.S.C. 
§ 46505 (providing criminal penalties for carrying a weapon 
or explosive on aircraft); see also 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 172.101, 175.10(a) (listing “hazardous materials” that are 
not permitted on flights).  They also qualify as officers under 
the second definition because they are appointed by the Under 
                                              
8 The majority criticizes my use of “general dictionary 
definitions” and claims they unnecessarily expand the 
proviso’s scope.  Majority Op. at 47 n.30.  Those definitions, 
however, are consistent across multiple dictionaries and fit 
the broader context of § 2680(h).  The majority, by contrast, 
offers no definition of its own and instead relies on non-
textual sources to dilute its plain meaning.     
 
Moreover, my reading of the provision would not 
expand its reach.  I do not add extra text to it or assert that it 
should apply to officers who have no power to search, seize 
evidence, or make arrests.  Rather, I give effect to Congress’s 
language in its entirety without adding, as my colleagues do, 
limitations from outside sources.  See id. at 20-25 (relying on 
other statutes and inapplicable canons of construction to 
construe the proviso).   
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Secretary of Transportation for Security, see 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44935 note, and have the sole authority to conduct pre-
boarding screenings for “flights . . . originating in the United 
States,” id. § 44901(a). 
Accordingly, TSOs are unambiguously “officers of the 
United States” and thus fall within § 2680(h)’s proviso.   
D. Even were the text of the proviso ambiguous, 
we must resolve that ambiguity against the 
Government and in Pellegrino’s favor.  
My colleagues assert that § 2680(h) is ambiguous.  
See, e.g., Majority Op. at 21-22 n.12.  They claim “an unclear 
definitional phrase”—here, “investigative or law enforcement 
officer”—“may take meaning from the term to be defined.”  
Id. at 23 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 
(2010)). 
But the language of the proviso is neither ambiguous 
nor vague.  Instead, it sets out two terms, “investigative or 
law enforcement officer,” and gives them a precise definition.  
My colleagues do not point to a single word in the definition 
that is unclear.  Rather, they seem troubled by the 
“unintended breadth” of the proviso and consider that 
perception a license to construe it narrowly.  Id. at 22 n.12 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  This is not enough to 
establish ambiguity.   
However, even if we assume the text is ambiguous, it 
would not authorize us to construe the proviso narrowly in 
favor of sovereign immunity and against Pellegrino’s claims.  
Instead, the Supreme Court has instructed us to construe the 
Federal Tort Claims Act broadly and has stated that it “does 
not implicate the general rule that ‘a waiver of the 
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Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly 
construed . . . in favor of the sovereign.’”  Dolan, 546 U.S. at 
491 (emphasis added) (quoting Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 
192 (1996)); see also Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 
853 n.9 (1984) (“[U]nduly generous interpretations of the 
[Federal Tort Claims Act’s] exceptions run the risk of 
defeating the central purpose of the statute.”); United States v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554 (1951) (declining to 
construe the Federal Tort Claims Act in favor of sovereign 
immunity).  As the proviso reasserts the Federal Tort Claims 
Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity, we must resolve any 
ambiguity against the Government—that is, in favor of 
allowing Pellegrino’s claims to proceed to trial.  
Nonetheless, my colleagues note that Dolan tells us to 
construe the proviso in favor of the Government.  See 
Majority Op. at 48 n.31 (“To the extent Dolan does apply to 
an exception to an exception, it directs us ‘to identify those 
circumstances which are within the words and reason of the 
exception—no less and no more.’” (emphases added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dolan, 546 U.S. 
at 492)).  But that approach misconstrues Dolan, which 
discussed this rule in the context of § 2680’s subsections, 
almost all of which extend sovereign immunity.  See 546 U.S. 
at 492 (“Hence, the proper objective of a court attempting to 
construe one of the subsections of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 is to 
identify ‘those circumstances which are within the words and 
reason of the exception [i.e., the parts of § 2680 that are 
exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act’s waiver of 
immunity]—no less and no more.  Having made that inquiry 
here, we conclude [the Petitioner’s] claims fall 
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outside § 2680(b).” (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (internal citation omitted)).9   
Moreover, we cannot apply Dolan’s language here, as 
the Supreme Court in Millbrook took a markedly different 
approach in our context, casting the proviso in a broad light.  
See 569 U.S. at 57 (“Had Congress intended to further narrow 
the scope of the proviso, Congress could have limited 
it. . . .”); see also Campos, 888 F.3d at 737 (discussing 
“Millbrook’s refusal to allow limitations to be placed on 
the . . . proviso”); Bunch, 880 F.3d at 945 (“We are also 
influenced by the broad reading of the law[]enforcement 
proviso that the Court adopted in Millbrook.”).  
My colleagues also claim our case is governed by 
Foster v. United States, 522 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).  
Though Foster discusses an exception to an exception (i.e., 
those portions of § 2680 that reassert waiver), its analysis is 
circumscribed to § 2680(c)(1)-(4), a provision that has no 
bearing on Pellegrino’s claims.  See id. at 1079 (“[T]he text 
of § 2680(c)(1)-(4), uncontradicted by its legislative history, 
provides some support for a narrow reading of the re-waiver 
[a waiver, followed by an exception to the waiver (thus no 
waiver), followed by an exception to the exception (hence 
back to a waiver) is called a re-waiver] of sovereign 
immunity in forfeiture actions. . . .”).  Its holding is similarly 
                                              
9 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) contains only an exception to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, as it states, “The provisions 
of . . . [§] 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to— . . . (b) 
[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent 
transmission of letters or postal matter.”  It does not contain 
an exception to the exception (i.e., a proviso) that reasserts 
the waiver. 
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limited to § 2680(c)(1)-(4), and it provided no indication 
whether the Court would reach the same result in the context 
of § 2680(h).  See id. (“Consequently, we hold that the re-
waiver of sovereign immunity in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)-
(4) applies only to property seized solely for the purpose of 
forfeiture, even if the government had in mind, and later 
pursued, judicial forfeiture of property seized initially for a 
legitimate criminal investigative purpose.”).  Thus Foster 
does not provide an adequate basis for narrowly reading 
§ 2680(h)’s proviso. 
Accordingly, even if the text were ambiguous, we are 
bound to resolve that ambiguity against sovereign immunity.  
See Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 57; Campos, 888 F.3d at 737; 
Bunch, 880 F.3d at 945.  As such, § 2680(h) does not bar 
Pellegrino’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious 
prosecution claims.  
III. The majority’s arguments do not counsel a 
 different result. 
My colleagues arrive at a different outcome after 
consulting various canons of construction, similar statutes 
across the Code, and the text of the Transportation Security 
Act.  They examine the legislative history surrounding 
§ 2680(h) and our sister Circuits’ case law for guidance.  In 
view of these sources, they hold that § 2680(h)’s proviso 
extends only to criminal law enforcement officers and thus 
does not apply to TSOs.  
While some of their reasoning may be supportive in 
isolation, it cannot prevail over the clear text of § 2680(h).  
Nor can it overcome binding Supreme Court precedent that 
directs us how to apply the canons of construction and 
interpret statutory definitions.  Consequently, I do not believe 
the proviso can be read to exclude TSOs from its reach.   
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A. Per Supreme Court precedent, we cannot 
employ the canons of construction to 
constrict the proviso’s clear and 
unambiguous text. 
To recap my colleagues’ reasoning, they claim 
§ 2680(h)’s proviso is directed to criminal law enforcement 
officers because each of its powers—“‘to execute searches, to 
seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal 
law’—has criminal law connotations.”  Majority Op. at 20 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)).  They state that each of the 
powers “helps give meaning to the others, reinforcing that . . . 
the term ‘investigative or law enforcement officer’ . . . means 
those officers who perform criminal law enforcement 
functions.”  Id. at 21.  In support of their position, they rely 
on the canon noscitur a sociis, which tells us that “a word is 
known by the company it keeps.”  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 
513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995). 
Although this canon is a “useful rule of 
construction . . . where words are of obscure or doubtful 
meaning,” Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 
514, 520 (1923), it is not used when the text is unambiguous, 
see Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (noting the 
canon was inapplicable because the pertinent provision 
already contained a statutory definition); United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010) (declining to apply 
noscitur a sociis when the text “contain[ed] little ambiguity”).  
“[W]hen words have a clear definition, and all other 
contextual clues support that meaning, the canons cannot 
properly defeat Congress’s decision to draft broad 
legislation.”  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1097 
(2015) (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
Here, because § 2680(h) was enacted six years after 
the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio, “execute searches” 
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has a clear meaning that derives from the Court’s definition 
of a search: “a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a 
person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find 
weapons. . . .”  392 U.S. at 16; see also Albernaz v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1981) (“[I]f anything is to be 
assumed from the congressional silence on this point, it is that 
Congress was aware of the [pertinent Supreme Court 
holding] and legislated with it in mind.  It is not a function of 
this Court to presume that Congress was unaware of what it 
accomplished. . . .” (third alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  There is no indication that 
Congress intended to depart from that meaning when it 
enacted § 2680(h).  Nor is there any indication that the 
relevant portion of the proviso is ambiguous.  In this context, 
the canons are not in play here.  Moreover, “canons of 
construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts 
determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a 
statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon 
before all others,” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253 (1992), “that courts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it 
says there,” id. at 253-54.  
In any event, we have observed that noscitur a sociis 
“is of little help where other evidence reveals that Congress 
intended to treat the disputed term differently from its 
neighbors.”  In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 288 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  “When Congress has separated terms with the 
conjunction ‘or,’” we concluded “that [it] intended to give the 
terms ‘their separate, normal meanings.’”  Id. (quoting Garcia 
v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73 (1984)); see also In re Gi 
Nam, 273 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating noscitur a 
sociis has “no application” when Congress separates distinct 
terms with disjunctive phrasing).  The Supreme Court has 
articulated the same view, declining to apply the canon to a 
list of three “disparate” items—“congressional, 
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administrative, or [Government Accountability Office] 
sources”—because it would “rob” each term “of its 
independent and ordinary significance.”10  Graham Cty. Soil 
& Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 
559 U.S. 280, 288-89 (2010) (alteration omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reiter, 442 U.S. at 338-
39).11  Although the Court acknowledged that the terms had a 
                                              
10 Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the touchstone 
of my inquiry is not whether “the statute is phrased in the 
disjunctive.”  Majority Op. at 22 n.12.  Instead, I examine 
whether a statutory list contains a set of terms that have “a[] 
comparable . . . meaning.”  Graham Cty. Soil & Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 
280, 289 n.7 (2010); see also infra note 11.  
 
11 Although my colleagues state noscitur a sociis “is 
‘often wisely applied where a word is capable of many 
meanings,’” Majority Op. at 22 n.12 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)), the Supreme 
Court’s analysis is more nuanced.  While the Court has relied 
on the canon when the terms share “a[] comparable core of 
meaning,” Wilson, 559 U.S. at 289 n.7, it has cautioned 
against it if to do so would “rob” any term “of its independent 
and ordinary significance,” id. at 288 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Reiter, 442 U.S. at 338-39).  Indeed, 
the Court has rebuked lower courts—including our Circuit—
that apply the canon haphazardly without reference to its 
precedents.  See id.  
 
 Thus, as the majority notes, the Court has relied on the 
canon to interpret the phrase “exploration, discovery, or 
prospecting.”  Before doing so, however, it noted that the 
words in that phrase had a common “core of meaning” and 
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similar “connotation,” that was not a critical factor in its 
analysis.  Id. at 289 n.7 (declining to apply the canon to the 
phrase “congressional, administrative, or GAO sources” even 
though each term had a “governmental connotation”).  
Instead, it emphasized each word’s distinct meaning and 
declined to restrict that meaning by way of the canon.  See id. 
at 288-89.  
The Supreme Court’s reasoning is apt here, as 
§ 2680(h)’s proviso lists three separate phrases that describe 
different activities: “execute searches,” “seize evidence,” and 
“make arrests.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  All three terms have a 
“character of [their] own” that cannot be “submerged” by 
their common connotation.  Russell Motor Car, 261 U.S. at 
519.  Thus “execute searches” cannot be read in the same 
vein as “seize evidence” or “make arrests.”  Instead, it must 
be read consistently with its plain meaning, which is delinked 
as a disjunctive (that is, separate) concept.   
With this in mind, the majority suggests the meaning 
of “execute searches” still sounds in criminal law, as the 
                                                                                                     
that the canon would not “rob” any term “of its independent 
and ordinary significance.”  Id. at 288-89 & n.7 (quoting 
Reiter, 442 U.S. at 338-39); see also Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307 
(engaging in this analysis).  By contrast, the Court has refused 
to apply the canon to “congressional, administrative, or GAO 
sources” because the terms in the list were not “completely 
harmonious.”  Wilson, 559 U.S. at 288 (alteration omitted).   
 
Noscitur a sociis thus is “not an invariable rule” that 
we must resort to in every instance.  Russell Motor Car, 261 
U.S. at 519.  Nor is it in play here, as the terms in § 2680(h) 
are not synonymous and share no core meaning.  See Wilson, 
559 U.S. at 289 n.7. 
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phrase “execute a search” is typically used when a warrant is 
involved.  The Seventh Circuit recently rejected a similar 
argument.  See Bunch, 880 F.3d at 945 (“[W]e note 
that [§] 2680(h) does not require [a federal agent] to have had 
authority to seek and execute search warrants; it speaks only 
of executing searches, and many searches do not require 
warrants.” (emphasis in original)).  Congress also drafted 
§ 2680(h) to provide a remedy against warrantless searches.  
See S. Rep. No. 93-588, at 2790 (1973) (stating § 2680(h) 
was enacted in the aftermath of raids in Collinsville, Illinois, 
where federal agents “entered . . . two houses without 
warrants . . . , kicked in the doors without warning, shout[ed] 
obscenities, and threaten[ed] the occupants with drawn 
weapons”).  In line with these principles, plaintiffs have relied 
on § 2680(h) to recover for abuses related to warrantless 
searches and seizures.  See, e.g., Bunch, 880 F.3d at 943-44 
(holding a forensic chemist’s inspection could be a search 
under § 2680(h)). 
My view is that, given the broad reach of the proviso, 
“execute searches” does not take its meaning from the term 
“execute a warrant,” and its clear-cut meaning governs our 
analysis.  See id. at 943, 945 (suggesting “search” in 
§ 2680(h) could refer to inspections performed by officers 
and employees, a search incident to arrest, searches under the 
automobile exception, searches performed with consent, and 
protective sweeps); Execute, Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary (1971) (providing several 
definitional options of “execute,” none of which include a 
reference to “executing warrants”). 
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B. Other statutes are not effective guideposts 
for interpreting § 2680(h)’s language because 
none of them contain the same definition.  
My colleagues examine other provisions in the U.S. 
Code that use the term “investigative or law enforcement 
officer.”  They find that the term is used in only one other 
statute: Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, and the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, which 
amended Title III (for simplicity, I refer to both statutes as 
“Title III”), see id. §§ 3121-3127.  In their view, Title III’s 
context tells us that the term “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” covers only criminal law enforcement 
personnel.  Thus they conclude § 2680(h) must also 
encompass only criminal law enforcement officers.  
Title III, however, is not helpful to our inquiry because 
it provides its own definition of “investigative or law 
enforcement officer.”  It considerably departs from that of 
§ 2680(h), as it includes attorneys.  See id. § 2510 (stating an 
investigative or law enforcement officer is “any officer . . . 
who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to 
make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any 
attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the 
prosecution of such offenses” (emphases added)).  It also 
includes the term “conduct investigations,” while § 2680(h) 
includes the disjunctive phrases “to execute searches” and “to 
seize evidence.”  See id.  With these obvious distinctions, I 
am doubtful that Title III and § 2680(h) should be read 
consistently or that the former constricts the latter.  See 
Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 606 (1970) (declining 
to construe two provisions similarly because “the coverage of 
these [two] sections is not identical”); In re Fed.-Mogul 
Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 372-73 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting two 
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provisions of the Bankruptcy Code should not be read in the 
same way in view of their distinct language).   
In a similar vein, I am not persuaded that other 
statutory definitions of “law enforcement officer” limit 
§ 2680(h)’s text.12  See Majority Op. at 25 (listing definitions 
of “law enforcement officer” in Titles 12 and 18 of the U.S. 
Code).  Congress gave us no sign that these definitions carry 
any weight in the context of our case.  Indeed, it could have 
easily written § 2680(h) to incorporate any of them, but chose 
not to do so.  See Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 56-57 (rejecting an 
argument that would narrow the definition of “investigative 
or law enforcement officer” and stating Congress could have 
restricted the scope of § 2680(h)’s proviso if it wished); see 
also Burgess, 553 U.S. at 130-31 (illustrating that Congress 
knows how to “incorporate the definition of a particular word 
into the definition of a compound expression”).  Instead (and 
to repeat), it gave § 2680(h) its own definition of 
“investigative or law enforcement officer,” which we must 
apply “even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”  
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 942.  We may not resolve any 
“‘dissonance’ between ordinary meaning and the 
unambiguous words of a definition . . . in favor of [the term’s] 
ordinary meaning.  If that were the case, there would hardly 
be any use in providing a definition.”  Bond v. United States, 
134 S. Ct. 2077, 2096 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
Accordingly, other provisions and statutory definitions 
do not illuminate the meaning of § 2680(h)’s proviso and 
cannot be used to cabin its reach.  
                                              
12 These definitions also do not shed light on § 2680(h) 
as a whole because the subsection refers to “investigative or 
law enforcement officers.”  
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C. The Transportation Security Act does not 
clarify whether the proviso extends to TSOs. 
The majority states § 2680(h)’s proviso does not 
include TSOs because the Transportation Security Act 
“distinguishes between ‘employees’ . . . and ‘law enforcement 
officers.’”  Majority Op. at 39.  They note it classifies 
screeners as employees, but at the same time allows the 
TSA’s Under Secretary to “designate an employee . . . to 
serve as a law enforcement officer.”  49 U.S.C. § 114(p)(1).  
The latter may “carry a firearm[,] make an arrest . . . [,] 
and . . . seek and execute warrants.”  Id. § 114(p)(2).  Because 
the Act consistently differentiates between screeners and TSA 
law enforcement officers in this respect, the majority infers 
the former are not “investigative or law enforcement officers” 
under § 2680(h).  
 The Transportation Security Act (like the other statutes 
discussed above) has its own definition of “law enforcement 
officer.”  In full it defines “law enforcement officer” as an 
“employee” who may. . . 
 (A) carry a firearm; 
(B) make an arrest without a warrant for any 
offense against the United States committed in 
the presence of the officer, or for any felony 
cognizable under the laws of the United States 
if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the person to be arrested has committed or is 
committing the felony; and 
(C) seek and execute warrants for arrest or 
seizure of evidence issued under the authority 
of the United States upon probable cause that a 
violation has been committed. 
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 Id. § 114(p)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).  This definition 
significantly varies from the expansive definition in 
§ 2680(h), which uses disjunctive phrasing and includes “any 
officer of the United States who is empowered by law to 
execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for 
violations of Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (emphasis 
added).  The term “law enforcement officer” in § 114(p) is 
also at odds with the broader term “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” in § 2680(h).  See Corrected Tr. of Oral 
Arg. at 21:21–22:4 (noting this key distinction between 
§ 114(p) and § 2680(h)).  In view of these obvious 
differences, § 114(p) is neither instructive nor helpful in 
construing § 2680(h).   
 There is also no indication that Congress drafted 
§ 114(p) with § 2680(h)’s proviso in mind.  If Congress 
intended to use the former to immunize TSOs from liability, it 
would have “provide[d] a relatively clear indication of its 
intent in the text of . . . [either] provision.”  TC Heartland 
LLC v. Kraft Food Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 
(2017).  More importantly, had Congress wished to limit the 
proviso to criminal law enforcement officers, it would have 
specified as much in § 2680(h).  See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 
468 (“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions. . . .”).  It did not do so.  My takeaway: there is no 
basis for importing § 114(p) into the Federal Tort Claims Act 
to bar Pellegrino’s claim.  Nor is there any reason to use this 
case to bar other plaintiffs’ claims against agents who are not 
criminal law enforcement officers.   
 My colleagues do not address these points.  Instead, 
they maintain that “§ 114(p) remains instructive” in this 
context “because it reflects Congress’s own distinction 
between TSA screeners and ‘law enforcement officers’ in 
Title 49, which tracks [the] distinction between ‘employees’ 
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and ‘officers’ in the [Federal Tort Claims Act].”  Majority 
Op. at 40 n.27 (alteration omitted).  They claim other statutes 
similarly distinguish between employees and law 
enforcement officers and suggest we should follow these 
distinctions for the purposes of § 2680(h).  See id. at 40-41 
n.27. 
 I cannot join the majority in adopting this approach 
because it is an invitation to dilute § 2680(h)’s text.  As 
noted, § 114(p) does not match the proviso’s language and 
does not even define the same terms as the proviso.  Compare 
49 U.S.C. § 114(p) (defining “law enforcement officer” using 
conjunctive language), with 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (defining 
“investigative or law enforcement officer” using disjunctive 
language).  As such, it is not an appropriate guidepost for 
determining whether TSOs fall within the proviso’s reach.  
See Bunch, 880 F.3d at 944 (“[Section 2680(h)] defines 
[‘investigative or law enforcement officer’] as a person with 
legal authority to ‘execute searches, to seize evidence, or to 
make arrests. . . .’  Any one of those three powers will do.” 
(emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2680(h))).     
 Instead of narrowing § 2680(h) and importing § 114(p) 
into its framework, it is our job to enforce the proviso’s 
explicit language.  While TSOs do not fall within the terms of 
§ 114(p), they are covered by § 2680(h).  Neither § 114(p) 
nor other sections of the Transportation Security Act 
expressly preclude TSOs from the scope of the § 2680(h) 
proviso.  Rather, they suggest the opposite: TSOs execute 
searches, see 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a), and have the legal 
authority to do so, see id.13  Thus, when the statutory scheme 
                                              
13 Even if the Transportation Security Act were less 
straightforward in this context, it does not control the 
interpretation of § 2680(h) because the former postdates the 
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is considered as a whole, TSOs are investigative or law 
enforcement officers that are subject to the proviso.  See 
Bunch, 880 F.3d at 943-45 (engaging in the same analysis for 
a forensic chemist employed by the ATF); Sami v. United 
States, 617 F.2d 755, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (concluding U.S. 
National Central Bureau officers were within § 2680(h), and 
thus unprotected by immunity, even though they “do not 
initiate or conduct investigations of their own but act 
primarily as conduits and screeners of information between 
foreign police departments and federal and state counterparts” 
(footnote omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).    
Lastly, I note the consequences of my colleagues’ 
approach.  No other Court of Appeals has gone as far as they 
do by categorically barring certain classes of individuals (i.e., 
those who are not criminal law enforcement officers) from the 
reach of the proviso.  Nor has any other Court of Appeals 
relied on another statute’s and an agency’s classifications to 
determine whether a federal agent is an “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” under § 2680(h).14  The majority’s 
                                                                                                     
latter.  See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 398 n.3 
(2013) (“Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing 
law.”).   
 
14 Although the Eleventh Circuit relied on statutory 
distinctions in Corbett v. Transportation Security 
Administration, it did not reference the agency’s own 
distinctions or non-binding directives in support of its 
position.  See 568 F. App’x 690, 701 (11th Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam).  Moreover, Corbett was an unpublished opinion, 
making it non-precedential and non-binding.  See 11th Cir. R. 
36-2, I.O.P. 7 (“The court generally does not cite to its 
‘unpublished’ opinions because they are not binding 
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reasoning would allow Congress—and perhaps even 
agencies—to exempt individuals from the proviso’s reach 
simply by categorizing them as employees who lack criminal 
law enforcement powers.  See Majority Op. at 43 (citing a 
TSA directive that discusses the distinctions between TSOs 
and law enforcement officers).  It would also empower courts 
to disregard § 2680(h)’s statutory definition of “investigative 
or law enforcement officer” in favor of those terms’ meanings 
as perceived by the particular judicial panel.  Such a rule 
would allow courts to expand or contract statutory definitions 
as they see fit.  See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (observing the “judge-
empowering consequences” of an “interpretive rule” that 
would allow a term’s ordinary meaning to prevail over its 
statutory definition).  It would further allow Congress to 
depart from § 2680(h)’s literal text “in vague terms or 
ancillary provisions.”  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468.  I do not 
believe that this is the correct interpretive method to apply 
here.  See Sami, 617 F.2d at 765 (“We are not inclined to read 
into [§ 2680(h)’s] language . . . a narrower limitation on 
liability than that suggested by the plain meaning of the 
words.”).   Nor am I convinced this is what Congress intended 
when it enacted § 2680(h), § 114(p), or other provisions of 
the Transportation Security Act. 
The conclusion for me is simple.  I am not inclined to 
read the proviso in § 2680(h) as narrowly as my colleagues, 
as I do not see the Transportation Security Act as limiting the 
scope set by the proviso’s simple and direct words.  
                                                                                                     
precedent.  The court may cite to them where they are 
specifically relevant to determine whether the predicates for 
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or double jeopardy exist in 
the case, to ascertain the law of the case, or to establish the 
procedural history or facts of the case.”).   
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D. Legislative history cannot overcome the clear 
text of § 2680(h) and does not preclude 
administrative searches from its purview.  
My colleagues next turn to the legislative history of 
§ 2680(h) and refer to statements made by two members of 
Congress and comments made at a hearing by a Department 
of Justice official.  They contend these snippets confirm that 
the proviso covers only criminal law enforcement officers.  
Ultimately, however, “it is the statute, and not [its legislative 
history], which is the authoritative expression of the law. . . .”  
City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 
(1994).  “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required 
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its 
terms.”  Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 
Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 
F.3d 548, 556 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)).  “[W]e 
may only look to legislative history if [the] plain meaning 
produces a result that is not just unwise but is clearly absurd.”  
United States v. Terlingo, 327 F.3d 216, 221 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2003) (Becker, C.J.) (second alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
When we look to § 2680(h)’s text, it nowhere 
makes any limiting reference to criminal law enforcement 
officers.  While the legislative history contains several 
references to “law enforcement officers,” it is worth noting 
that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil 
to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the 
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of 
our legislators by which we are governed.”  Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).  It 
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follows that § 2680(h)’s legislative history does not give us 
an adequate basis to circumscribe its plain text.   
My colleagues also discuss the legislative history of a 
related provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3724, which authorizes the 
Attorney General to settle certain claims brought against “an 
investigative or law enforcement officer as defined in section 
2680(h) of [T]itle 28 who is employed by the Department of 
Justice. . . .”  In their view, that provision’s history before 
Congress suggests by analogy § 2680(h) applies only to 
criminal law enforcement officers, as it specifically excludes 
from its reach “the litigating arms of the Antitrust Division or 
. . . the Civil Rights Division.”  H.R. Rep. No. 101-46, at 8 
(1989).   
But these references cannot limit the proviso to 
criminal law enforcement personnel because both the 
Antitrust Division and Civil Rights Division perform criminal 
law enforcement functions.  See Sections and Offices, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/atr/sections-and-
offices (last visited July 9, 2018) (indicating the Division has 
five “[c]riminal [s]ections and [o]ffices”); About the Division, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-
division (last visited July 9, 2018) (stating the Division has a 
criminal section).  Nor does the legislative history 
differentiate between administrative searches and criminal 
law enforcement functions, as it indicates § 3724 applies to 
agents who conduct both.15  See H.R. Rep. No. 101-46, at 7 
                                              
15 My colleagues claim “the fact that traditional 
criminal law enforcement officers may also have occasion to 
perform administrative searches . . . in no way casts doubt on 
the textual and historical reasons to believe that § 2680(h) and 
§ 3724 exclude from their reach those who perform only 
administrative searches.”  Majority Op. at 31-32 n.19 
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(1989) (noting § 3724 applies to “a DEA Agent, . . . a Border 
Patrolman, or a Deputy Marshal”); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 566(e)(C) (noting the U.S. Marshals Service is authorized to 
issue certain types of administrative subpoenas); United 
States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“Limited administrative searches may be conducted at the 
border. . . .”).  Section 3724 thus gives us no reason to 
exclude administrative searches from the purview of 
§ 2680(h)’s proviso.  At best, it tells us that administrative 
searches may fall within the latter’s terms.  
However, even if § 3724 lacked these references, we 
should be mindful that “Congress . . . does not . . . hide 
elephants in mouseholes.”  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468.  Had it 
intended the proviso to cover only criminal searches and 
criminal law enforcement activities, “we would expect the 
text of . . . [§ 2680(h)] to say so.”  Puerto Rico v. Franklin 
Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (2016).  Here, no 
part of § 2680(h) includes the words “criminal,” “criminal 
searches,” or “criminal law enforcement personnel.”  In the 
absence of those or similar terms, I cannot join my colleagues 
in limiting its scope.16  
                                                                                                     
(emphases omitted).  But as noted earlier, § 2680(h) provides 
no textual basis to exclude administrative searches from its 
ambit, and § 3724 makes no distinction between 
administrative searches and other law enforcement functions.  
Because neither provision explicitly distinguishes the two, we 
should disdain doing the same, as, among other things, we 
lack the authority to do so.       
 
16 Other provisions support my conclusion.  Like Title 
31, Title 19 contains a section that allows the Treasury 
Secretary to settle intentional tort claims brought against “an 
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E. Our sister Circuits’ case law does not restrict 
  § 2680(h)’s reach.  
The majority also examines other Circuits’ case law, 
stating “other Courts of Appeals . . . have treated only those 
performing criminal law enforcement duties as ‘investigative 
or law enforcement officers’ under the proviso.”  Majority 
Op. at 34.  In my colleagues’ view, their holding aligns with 
those Circuits.  
I disagree.  None of our sister Circuits have stated that 
criminal law enforcement duties are a prerequisite in the 
context before us.  Cf. Bunch, 880 F.3d at 943-45 (rejecting 
the Government’s argument that only law enforcement 
officers are covered by the § 2680(h) proviso and concluding 
a chemist who analyzed samples in a laboratory could 
“execute searches” or “seize evidence” under it).  Moreover, 
“federal courts do not sit as councils of revision, empowered 
                                                                                                     
investigative or law enforcement officer (as defined in section 
2680(h) of [T]itle 28) who is employed by the Customs 
Service. . . .”  19 U.S.C. § 1630.  Elsewhere, though, the 
statute allows Customs officers to “inspect[]” “[a]ll 
merchandise and baggage imported or brought in from any 
contiguous country,” essentially giving them the authority to 
conduct searches that resemble TSA screenings.  Id. § 1461; 
see also 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 (“All persons, baggage, and 
merchandise arriving in the Customs territory of the United 
States from places outside thereof are liable to inspection and 
search by a Customs officer. . . .”); United States v. Hill, 939 
F.2d 934, 936 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting “[c]ustoms agents may 
conduct suspicionless searches. . . .”).  Nowhere does the 
statute immunize such searches from liability.  And it does 
not distinguish between those searches and other traditional 
criminal enforcement activities.   
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to rewrite legislation. . . .”  United States v. Rutherford, 442 
U.S. 544, 555 (1979).  “We are not at liberty to rewrite the 
statute to reflect a meaning we deem more desirable” or to 
import a meaning derived from selected case law.  Ali, 552 
U.S. at 228 (footnote omitted).  “Instead, we must give effect 
to the text Congress enacted:” § 2680(h)’s proviso applies to 
TSOs because it encompasses any officer who is empowered 
by law to execute searches for violations of federal law.  Id.  
In addition to the Seventh Circuit, see Bunch, 880 F.3d 
at 943-45, other Circuits also have construed § 2680(h) 
differently from the majority, see Celestine, 841 F.2d at 852-
53 (omitting the terms “criminal” or “criminal law 
enforcement officer” in its discussion of § 2680(h)); Hoston 
v. Silbert, 681 F.2d 876, 878-79 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) 
(same); Caban, 671 F.2d at 1234-35 (same); EEOC v. First 
Nat’l Bank of Jackson, 614 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 
1980) (same); Hernandez v. Lattimore, 612 F.2d 61, 64 n.7 
(2d Cir. 1979) (same); Solomon v. United States, 559 F.2d 
309, 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (same); Johnson v. 
United States, 547 F.2d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam) (same).  Instead of distinguishing between criminal 
law enforcement officers and administrative personnel, see 
Majority Op. at 34-37, these Courts have carefully examined 
whether a defendant’s job duties fit the proviso on a case-by-
case basis, see, e.g., Celestine, 841 F.2d at 852-53 
(undertaking this analysis for Veterans Administration 
hospital security guards); First Nat’l Bank of Jackson, 614 
F.2d at 1007-08 (same for Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission agents); Johnson, 547 F.2d at 691 (same for 
doctors at a Veterans Administration hospital).  This indicates 
the inquiry under § 2680(h) is more contextual than the 
majority’s approach, taking into account an agent’s specific 
powers rather than her status as a criminal law enforcement 
officer. 
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Critically, at least two Circuits have not adopted the 
majority’s specific framework.  In Sami v. United States, the 
D.C. Circuit held that a defendant was an “investigative or 
law enforcement officer” even though he lacked several 
attributes my colleagues deem conclusive in their analysis.  
617 F.2d at 765.  The Court noted that the defendant’s status 
or training as a law enforcement officer did not control its 
inquiry.  See id. at 764.  It also assigned no importance to the 
fact that the defendant did not “initiate or conduct 
investigations of [his] own but act[ed] primarily as [a] 
conduit[] and screener[] of information between foreign 
police departments and federal and state counterparts.”  Id.  
Rather, it cast § 2680(h)’s legislative history in an expansive 
light and viewed its text as “set[ting] finite boundaries around 
the kind of law enforcement abuses for which [Congress] 
wished to make the [G]overnment liable.”  Id. at 764-65.  In 
doing so, the Court declined to “read . . . a narrower 
limitation on liability than that suggested by the plain 
meaning of the words.”  Id. at 765. 
As noted, Bunch also declined to limit the proviso to 
law enforcement officers, 880 F.3d at 944-45, and did not 
limit the term “execute searches” to the criminal context, id. 
at 945.17  It did not draw any significance from the types of 
                                              
17 The majority nonetheless portrays Bunch as 
corroborating its holding because “it offered, as examples of 
the types of searches covered by the proviso, searches 
incident to arrest, protective sweeps, and searches conducted 
pursuant to the automobile exception . . . —i.e., searches 
conducted by criminal law enforcement officers.”  Majority 
Op. at 36 (internal citation omitted).  This account of Bunch 
hyperfocuses on an isolated string cite in the Court’s opinion, 
see Bunch, 880 F.3d at 945, while ignoring its ultimate 
conclusion, see id. at 943 (holding an inspection performed 
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investigations the chemist-defendant performed.18  See id. at 
943.  Nor did it give conclusive weight to the chemist’s 
employment status.  See id.  Although he was an “ATF 
officer,” the Court noted that term referred to both “[ATF] 
officer[s] or employee[s].”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting 27 C.F.R. § 55.11 (1995)).  
The approach of my colleagues sharply differs from 
our sister Circuits’ reasoning in three main ways.  First, they 
give determinative weight to an agent’s status as a law 
enforcement officer even though the other Circuits did not do 
so.  See id. at 944-45; Sami, 617 F.2d at 764.  Second, they 
highlight TSOs’ limited roles and their dependence on law 
enforcement officers, and yet this feature had no effect on the 
Seventh or D.C. Circuit’s analysis.  See Bunch, 880 F.3d at 
944-45; Sami, 617 F.2d at 764.  Lastly, they read additional 
                                                                                                     
by a chemist could be enough to trigger liability for malicious 
prosecution under § 2680(h)).   
 
18 Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the Seventh 
Circuit did not emphasize the chemist’s criminal law 
enforcement duties.  Indeed, the word “criminal” never shows 
up in this portion of its discussion.  See Bunch, 880 F.3d at 
943.  Although the Court did mention Title 18 of the U.S. 
Code, it observed the chemist’s duties stemmed from Title 27 
of the Code of Federal Regulations.  See id. (“The Secretary 
had authority to promulgate regulations to carry out these 
powers, . . . and he did so in 27 C.F.R. Part 55. . . .  The 
regulations authorized ‘[a]ny ATF officer’ to ‘inspect the site 
of any accident or fire in which there is reason to believe that 
explosive materials were involved.’” (third alteration in 
original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting 27 C.F.R. 
§ 55.31 (1995))). 
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language into the proviso to restrain its reach while Sami and 
Bunch expressly refused to do the same.  See Bunch, 880 F.3d 
944-45; Sami, 617 F.2d at 765.  
In conclusion, my colleagues’ interpretive framework 
finds little support in analogous decisions from our sister 
Circuits, and at least two Circuits have disregarded the key 
factors they consider decisive in their analysis.     
F. Our case law cannot be read as limiting  
  § 2680(h)’s scope.  
My colleagues claim their holding is consistent with 
Matsko v. United States, 372 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004).  In their 
view, Matsko effectively narrowed § 2680(h) to criminal law 
enforcement personnel because it stated that “employees of 
administrative agencies, no matter what investigative conduct 
they are involved in, do not come within the . . . [proviso].”  
Id. at 560.   
Before discussing Matsko, it is important to note that 
the Supreme Court rejected most of its reasoning in a recent 
case.  See Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 54-56 (overruling Pooler v. 
United States, 787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986), and its progeny, 
including Matsko).  As such, it is questionable the effect 
Matsko has in our case.  Even if we assume its influence is 
significant, we cannot read it as categorically excluding all 
employees from the proviso’s reach.  As noted already, VA 
police officers and INS agents would not qualify as 
“investigative or law enforcement officers” even though we 
know they are.   
The majority acknowledges this, but asserts Matsko 
draws a line “between administrative personnel performing 
solely administrative functions and those . . . expressly 
designated law enforcement officers or assigned law 
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enforcement duties.”  Majority Op. at 33.  But the problem 
with this argument is that Matsko made no such distinction.  
It never mentioned the term “criminal law enforcement 
officer,” nor did it refer to “criminal law enforcement duties.”  
While it explained what types of agents are purportedly 
outside the realm of the proviso, Matsko never told us who 
would fit within it.  Hence it does not stand for the broad 
holding the majority now attributes to it.  
More tellingly, Matsko’s principle does not receive 
universal support from our sister Circuits.  Bunch, for 
example, held a chemist who was primarily responsible for 
“investigative conduct”—“inspect[ing] the site of any 
accident or fire in which there is reason to believe that 
explosive materials were involved”—could be an 
investigative or law enforcement officer under § 2680(h).  
880 F.3d at 943 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
27 C.F.R. § 55.31 (1995)).  It reached this conclusion even 
though the chemist was “[a]n officer or employee of 
[ATF] . . . authorized to perform any function related to . . . 
administration or enforcement.”  Id. (emphases added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 27 C.F.R. § 55.11 
(1995)).  
Bunch’s reasoning necessarily conflicts with Matsko 
because it did not give controlling weight to an agent’s 
employment status, see id., and emphasized the same 
investigatory powers that Matsko downplayed, compare id. 
(discussing the chemist’s authority to inspect sites of certain 
accidents or fires), with Matsko, 372 F.3d at 560 (noting the 
defendant had the “authority to inspect mines and investigate 
possible violations”).  This suggests we cannot understand 
Matsko as limiting the types of personnel or activities that fall 
within § 2680(h)’s terms.  If we do, we run the risk of 
advancing an inconsistent (and unduly narrow) reading of the 
provision.   
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We encounter a similar problem if we look to 
Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2017), for 
guidance.  As my colleagues correctly observe, it did not 
address whether TSOs fall within § 2680(h)’s proviso.  Yet 
they rely on its language to exclude TSOs from its reach.  See 
Majority Op. at 38 (“As we explained [in Vanderklok,] ‘TSA 
employees typically are not law enforcement officers and do 
not act as such.’” (quoting Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 208)); see 
also id. at 43 (“As we explained in Vanderklok, unlike 
criminal law enforcement officers, ‘line TSA employees are 
not trained on issues of probable cause, reasonable suspicion, 
and other constitutional doctrines that govern law 
enforcement officers.’” (quoting Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 
208)).  In their view, Vanderklok indicates “TSA screeners 
conduct only administrative searches, are not criminal law 
enforcement officers, and thus do not qualify as ‘investigative 
or law enforcement officers’ under [§ 2680(h)].”  Id. at 38. 
This approach misconstrues Vanderklok, which 
discussed TSOs’ law enforcement powers in the context of a 
Bivens claim for retaliatory prosecution under the First 
Amendment (a Bivens action refers to “a private right of 
action for damages . . . brought directly under the 
Constitution against federal officials,” Vanderklok, 868 F.3d 
at 198).  See id. at 208-09 (explaining “there is a practical 
concern with establishing a court-crafted remedy in the 
[airport screening context]” because “a First Amendment 
retaliatory prosecution claim hinges, in part, on whether the 
allegedly offending government employee had probable cause 
to take some enforcement action”).  It is also inconsistent 
with the proviso’s text, which includes investigative and law 
enforcement officers separately.  In light of Vanderklok’s 
limited scope and § 2680(h)’s expansive language, we cannot 
presume the two are linked.  Nor should we import the case’s 
dicta on probable cause and other law enforcement powers to 
our case, see Vanderklok, 868 F.3d at 208, as at least one 
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other Circuit has declined to do the same, see, e.g., Bunch, 
880 F.3d at 943-44.19   
IV. By analogizing TSA searches to routine 
administrative inspections, my colleagues preclude 
victims of TSA abuses from obtaining any 
meaningful remedy for a variety of intentional tort 
claims. 
Finally, my colleagues state that Pellegrino asks for a 
wholesale expansion of the Government’s tort liability for 
administrative searches.   They analogize TSA searches to 
routine administrative inspections and claim that a ruling in 
her favor would lead to a “significant . . . waiver of sovereign 
immunity” for all administrative screenings.  Majority Op. at 
27.   
As a preliminary matter, we need not worry that 
Pellegrino’s position would imperil the public fisc because 
amicus counsel allayed our concerns at oral argument: 
Individuals must file administrative complaints with the TSA 
before bringing any intentional-tort claims in federal court.  
In 2015, fewer than 200 individuals (out of 700 million 
individuals screened) filed complaints alleging the types of 
                                              
19 The Government argued in Bunch that the chemist-
defendant was not a law enforcement officer because he 
“work[ed] primarily in a laboratory analyzing physical 
evidence gathered by law enforcement agents . . . and 
provide[d] technical assistance to law enforcement 
agents. . . .”   Gov’t Br. at 24, Bunch v. United States, No. 16-
3775 (7th Cir. May 3, 2017).  As noted, the Seventh Circuit 
did not adopt this reading of the proviso.  Nor did it accept 
that the chemist’s job responsibilities barred him from being 
an officer included within the proviso.   
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harms that fall within § 2680(h)’s terms.  If 2015’s statistics 
are representative, there will be no “flood of litigation” 
against the Government for alleged TSO abuses.  Corrected 
Tr. of Oral Arg. at 26:20–21. 
Similarly, and to repeat for context, Pellegrino’s 
position is not as expansive as the majority portrays it.  
Instead of asking us to waive immunity in all contexts, she 
requests that we determine whether TSOs are investigative or 
law enforcement officers under § 2680(h) and whether TSA 
screenings fall within its reach.  Amicus counsel made this 
point at oral argument, noting the broad question of 
regulatory searches is not before us at this time.  See id. at 
9:1–2, 10:13–14.  Consequently, we should not extrapolate 
Pellegrino’s claims to include all possible administrative 
searches.  See PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he cardinal principle of 
judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, it is 
necessary not to decide more—counsels us to go no 
further.”).   
Moreover, TSA searches are markedly different from 
routine administrative inspections.  Unlike the screenings the 
majority cites (e.g., inspections of books, records, food 
products, establishments, warehouses, factories, and emission 
sources), see Majority Op. at 26-27 & n.16, TSA searches 
extend to an individual’s physical person and are directed to 
the general public.  TSOs have the authority to conduct “pat-
down searches,” which include “inspection[s] of the head, 
neck, arms, torso, legs, and feet . . . [,] includ[ing] head 
coverings and sensitive areas such as breasts, groin, and the 
buttocks.”  Security Screening, Transp. Sec. Admin., 
https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening (last visited 
July 9, 2018).  Given the wide scope of such screenings, they 
are not comparable to inspections of highly regulated items or 
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facilities.  Indeed, the potential for abuse and widespread 
harm may be greater with TSA searches than with almost any 
other type of administrative search.   
Amicus counsel acknowledges this point, highlighting 
several examples where TSOs abused their powers, injuring 
passengers.  See Suppl. Reply Br. at 13-14.    For example, 
TSOs at Denver International Airport “manipulated the 
security system . . . so that one of them, a man, could grope 
‘attractive’ male passengers coming through the 
checkpoint. . . .”  Lindsey Bever, TSA Employees Accused in 
Scanner Scam to ‘Grope’ Male Passengers, Wash. Post (Apr. 
15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/04/15/tsa-employees-accused-in-scanner-scam-
to-grope-male-passengers.  Although the TSA retained video 
footage, it could not identify any victims, which influenced 
the prosecutors’ initial decision not to file charges.  See id.  
Similarly, a male TSO at New York’s LaGuardia Airport told 
a 21-year-old woman he needed to screen “[her] body and 
[her] luggage,” led her into a bathroom, and sexually 
assaulted her.  Ray Sanchez, New York TSA Worker Accused 
of Sexually Abusing Passenger, CNN (Aug. 29, 2015, 7:29 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/28/us/new-york-tsa-
screener-charged/index.html (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  These types of abuses are more likely to occur in 
the context of TSA screenings, making them vastly dissimilar 
to regulatory searches confined to discrete items or facilities.  
While Pellegrino did not bring any assault or battery 
claims, the majority’s holding would bar other plaintiffs from 
bringing those claims, leaving them without a remedy.20  
                                              
20 Under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), the 
Government may deny that an employee was acting within 
the scope of her employment and thus allow a plaintiff to 
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Their holding would also immunize TSOs that retaliate 
against passengers who demand better screening conditions or 
voice concerns over screening procedures.  This cannot be 
what Congress intended in passing § 2680(h), which it 
characterized as “a minimal first step in providing a remedy 
against the Federal Government” for certain abuses.  S. Rep. 
No. 93-588, at 2792 (1973).  Nor is it faithful to statutory text 
that spells out a specific definition of “investigative or law 
enforcement officer” and nowhere limits itself to criminal law 
enforcement personnel.  
 Accordingly, TSA searches are not the same as 
administrative inspections, and, by equating these concepts, 
today’s holding denies recourse to those who are harmed by 
TSO abuses.   
V. Conclusion 
 Pellegrino brings us an issue of first impression.  She 
asks if she can recover against the TSOs who detained her 
and ordered her arrest at Philadelphia International Airport.  
Her specific claims—false arrest, false imprisonment, and 
malicious prosecution—fall within the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.  While it ordinarily bars intentional tort claims against 
Government officials, it contains a proviso that would allow 
her claims to go forward if TSOs are “investigative or law 
enforcement officers.”  They are so if they are “officer[s] of 
                                                                                                     
proceed against the employee in state court, see Armstrong v. 
Thompson, 759 F. Supp. 2d 89, 96 (D.D.C. 2011) (calling this 
a “denial of a Westfall certification”).  The Government’s 
decision to deny Westfall certification is largely within its 
discretion.  See Corrected Tr. of Oral Arg. at 30:16–22.  
Neither the Government nor the District Court denied 
Westfall certification to the TSOs in this appeal.      
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the United States . . . empowered by law to execute searches, 
to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal 
law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  TSOs fit this definition because 
they conduct searches, see 49 C.F.R. § 1546.207(a), and have 
the legal authority to do so, see 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a).  They 
are also “officers of the United States,” as they are tasked 
with administering and maintaining the law, see 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 172.101, 175.10(a), and are given the exclusive authority 
to conduct pre-boarding screenings for “flights . . . originating 
in the United States,” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a).  Thus they fall 
within the ambit of the proviso, and Pellegrino’s claims 
should proceed to trial. 
 Yet my colleagues hold that they are not covered.  
They look to other statutes for clarification, consult various 
canons of construction, and also examine legislative history.  
Ultimately they conclude § 2680(h) covers only criminal law 
enforcement officers.  In doing so, they depart from other 
Circuits’ interpretation of the proviso.  See Bunch, 880 F.3d at 
943-45; Sami, 617 F.2d at 764-65.  They also disregard 
Supreme Court precedent that tells us how to interpret 
§ 2680(h)’s language.  See Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 56-57.  
Their decision insulates TSOs from all intentional tort claims, 
leaving plaintiffs without a civil remedy.  Absent 
congressional action, they cannot recover if a TSO assaults 
them, unlawfully detains them, or unlawfully lodges a 
criminal complaint against them.  All of this is because my 
colleagues look through a lens that legislates “criminal” into a 
provision it nowhere appears.  
 This is not what Congress intended, as it enacted 
§ 2680(h) to serve as a broad remedy against tortious conduct.  
See S. Rep. No. 93-588, at 2791 (1973) (noting the provision 
“would submit the Government to liability whenever its 
agents act under color of law so as to injure the public 
through search and seizures that are conducted without 
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warrants”).  It also ignores Congress’s definition of 
“investigative or law enforcement officer,” which we must 
apply “even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”  
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 942.   
 In view of these principles, I disagree with my 
colleagues’ reasoning.  Instead of relying on non-textual 
sources, we must apply § 2680(h)’s plain language; other 
statutes, the canons, and legislative history (i.e., authorities 
outside of the proviso) cannot defeat its words.  Because the 
text tells the tale, I part with today’s holding.  I conclude that 
TSOs are investigative or law enforcement officers under 
§ 2680(h) and that TSA searches do not evade its reach.  In 
line with my conclusion, Pellegrino (and similarly situated 
plaintiffs) are entitled to their day in court.  I respectfully 
dissent.   
